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Turning Over The Reins: The
Abolition Of The Mandatory
Appellate Jurisdiction Of The
Supreme Court
By JOHN M. SIMPSON*

Introduction
The papers for 4704 cases were filed during the Supreme Court's
October, 1977 Term,' as compared with only 1426 fied in the 19481949 session.2 Despite this enormous rise in the number of requests for
review, the Court has consistently handed down approximately 150
opinions each year,3 and has managed to fully dispose of its docket by
the end of each term. The dramatic increase in the quantity of cases
filed, coupled with the number actually receiving plenary consideration, has convinced many members of the legal community that the
exigencies of the current caseload are forcing the Court to "ration justice. ' '4 Justice Douglas was accurate to a degree when he asserted that
many areas of the law once serving as abundant sources of litigation
have now become fallow under the weight of.settled precedent.' Yet,
in light of the growing complexity of the state and federal legal systems
and the general increase in constitutional litigation,6 it has become apparent that not every case the Court declines to review is either frivolous or of no national importance.
Against this background, several proposals to reform the appellate
* A.B., Harvard University, 1972; J.D., Columbia University, 1978. The author
wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Louis Henkin of the Columbia Law School
for his inspiration and thoughtful criticism in the preparation of this article.
1. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REv. 57,332 (1978).
2. he Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARv. L. REv. 119, 121 (1949).
3. Rehnquist, Whither the Courts,"60 A.B.A.J. 787, 789 (1974).
4. Griswold, Rationing Justice-The Supreme Court'r Caseload and What the Court
Does Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 335, 340 (1975).
5. Douglas, The Supreme Court and Its Case Load, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 411-12
(1960).
6. See Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 788.
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jurisdiction of the Supreme Court have been advanced.7 On May 18,
7. Past landmark reforms, spawned by concern over the federal court caseload, structure and jurisdiction, have included: the Circuit Court of Appeals Act Evarts Act), ch. 517,
26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), which established both the
present system of circuit courts of appeals and introduced discretionar review by certiorari,
and the Judges' Bill of 1925, ch. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 936 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 28,
& 48 U.S.C.), which narrowed the scope of mandatory review and broadened that of
Supreme Court review by certiorari. See generall, P. FISH, THE POLITtCS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 5-14,109 (1973); F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDES, THE BUSINESS OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1927) [hereinafter cited as FRANKFURTHER & LANDIS]; Blumstein,
The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction-Reform Proposals, DiscretionarrReview, and Writ
Dismissals,26 VAND. L. REV. 895 (1973); Surrency, A History ofFederal Courts, 28 Mo. L.
REV. 214 (1963); Note, CongressionalPrerogatives,the Constitution anda National Court of
Appeals, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715 (1978).
The major contemporary concern has been the burgeoning number of cases handled by
the national judiciary. The general goal of the proposed changes is to improve the judicial
decision-making process by lessening or diffusing federal judicial responsibilities. Such reforms ostensibly would improve the judicial process first by relieving the Supreme Court of
part of its caseload, thus allowing the Court to devote more time and energy to its remaining
cases, and second, by creating new tribunals to handle the diverted cases and to make the
decisions necessary for the maintenance of a coherent body of national law and precedent.
A full description of all recent proposals is beyond the scope of this article, but the work
of two groups, the Federal Judicial Center Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court (chaired by Paul Freund) [hereinafter cited as Freund Study Group] and the U.S.
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (chaired by former Senator
Roman L. Hruska) [hereinafter cited as Hruska Commission], typify current suggestions.
The Freund Study Group, appointed by Chief Justice Burger in 1971, studied the
Supreme Court's workload and concluded that the Court was overburdened. Their recommendations included (1) the formation of a National Court of Appeals, sitting above the
circuit courts of appeals but below the Supreme Court, to screen petitions for certiorari and
resolve federal circuit court conflicts not meritorious of Supreme Court review, and (2) the
curtailment of mandatory Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Sec FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, re-

printed at 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972). See also A. BICKEL, THE CASELO "D OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1973); H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VlEW 49-53 (1973); Al-

sup, A Policy Assessment of The National Court of Appeals, 25 HASTIxGS L.J. 1313 (1974);
Black, The National Court ofAppeals." An Unwise Proposal,83 YALE L.J. 883 (1974); Brennan, The NationalCourt ofAppeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473 (1973); Freund,
A NationalCourt ofAppeals, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1301 (1974); Goldberg. One Supreme Court,
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14; Poe, Schmidt & Whalen. J National Court of

Appeals: A Dissenting View, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 842 (1973); Retired Chief Justice Warren
Attacks, ChiefJustice Burger Defends FreundStudy Group s Composition and Proposal,59
A.B.A. J. 721 (1973).
The Hruska Commission, established by order of Congress, Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub.

L. No. 92-489, § 31, 86 Stat. 807, as amendedby Act of Sept. 19, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88
Stat. 1153, was prevented by its charter from considering questions of federal court jurisdiction. It did, however, propose a National Court of Appeals to handle cases presently being
denied Supreme Court review due to simple lack of capacity and also, in a different phase of
its work, proposed splitting both the Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals to better
handle increasing caseloads in those areas. See COMMISSION ON REVIS (ON OF THE FEDERAL
COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES:

RECOMMENDA-

TIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprintedat 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975). See alo HearingsBefore the
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1978, Senator DeConcini8 introduced Senate bill 3.100, the proposed
Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1978, which was designed to eliminate the major portion of the Court's obligatory appellate jurisdiction. 9
On July 13, 1978, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported favorably
on the bill,'" with the following comment:
The long historic experiment of imposing on the Supreme
Court an obligation to resolve appeals taken to it as of right has
utterly failed. The modem problems and practices of the Court
simply do not permit the luxury of determining the merits of all
cases within any designated jurisdictional class. To survive as a
viable institution, to control its docket to perform its great mission, the Supreme Court must be given total freedom to select for
resolution those few hundred cases-out of the several thousands
that are filed each year-that are found truly worthy of review.
S. 3100 will help to achieve that goal by reducing the needless
mandatory burdens virtually to the vanishing point."
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Second Phase, (1974-75);
Alsup, Reservations on the Proposalof the Hruska Commission to Establish a National Court
ofAppeals, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 431 (1976); Feinberg, A National Court ofAppeals?, 42
BROOKLYN L. REv. 611 (1976); Hruska, The National Court ofAppeals: An Analysis of
Viewpoints, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 286 (1975); Levin, Do We Need a New NationalCourt.,
TRIAL, Jan. 1976, at 32; Owens, 7he Hruska Commission's Proposed National Court of
Appeals, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 580 (1976); Swygert, The ProposedNational Court ofAppeals:
A Threat to JudicialSymmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976).
Although neither proposed National Court plan has made much headway, the calls for
curtailment of mandatory Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction met with some success when
Congress abolished direct appeals to the Supreme Court from most three-judge district
courts. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1, 2, 5, 90 Stat. 1120 (repealing 28
U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282, 2403).
8. Senator Dennis DeConcini (Dem., Arizona) is a member of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, and is chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery.
9. S. 3100, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. S7748-49 (1978). Of the categories of
compulsory appellate jurisdiction described in note 14 infra, S. 3100 preserves only appeals
from three-judge district courts and the certified question provisions.
S. 3100 is the successor to a similar but less comprehensive measure introduced by
Senator Bumpers in early 1977, S. 83, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S284 (1977).
.Although the Senate failed to act upon S. 3100 before the end of the ninety-fifth Congress,
the same measure has been introduced by Senators DeConcini and Bumpers in the form of
the proposed Supreme Court Jurisdiction Act of 1979, S. 450, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REC. S1666, S1671-72 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1979).
10. 124 CONG. REc. S10683 (1978).
11. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION ACT OF

1978, S. REP. No. 95-985, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 SENATE
REPORT]. The report outlined six principal reasons for abolishing the Court's mandatory
appellate jurisdiction: "First, it is unnecessary to the Court's performance of its role in our
society. Second, it impairs the Court's ability to select the right time and the right case for
the definitive resolution of recurring issues. Third, it imposes burdens on the Justices that
may hinder the Court in the performance of its function as expositor of the national law.
Fourth, the existence of the obligatory jurisdiction has made it necessary for the Court to
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Hearings conducted on Senate bill 3100 revealed no opposition from
academic, government or judicial quarters or from the bar,' 2 and the
bill has received 3the unanimous and unqualified endorsement of the
Supreme Court.'
This article will focus on the merits of eliminating the Supreme

Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions raising federal issues.'" Part I will examine the origins of obligatory review
and the historical underpinnings of the present legislative framework.

Part II will focus on the current practice of the Supreme Court and the
problems stemming from the exercise of its mandatory jurisdiction.
hand down summary dispositions that create confusion for lawyers, for lower court judges
and for citizens who must conform their conduct to the requirements of federal law. Fifth,
the obligatory jurisdiction creates burdens for lawyers seeking Supreme Court review. Finally, even if the idea of having an obligatory jurisdiction were sound, there is no practical
way of describing, in legislation, the kinds of cases that should fall within it." .d. at 2.
12. Supreme Court JurisdictionAct of1978. Hearingson S.3100 Before the Subcomna
on Improvements in JudicialMachinery ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judi iary, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as DeConciniCommittee Hearings].
13. Letter from the Supreme Court to Senator DeConcini (June 22, 1978), reprintedin
at 15-16 app. I.
1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note I1,
14. The present jurisdictional scheme is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976): "Final
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be
had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows: (1) By appeal, where is drawn in
question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States and the decision is against its
validity. (2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on
the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favor of its validity. (3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a
treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State
statute is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties
or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set
up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States. For the purposes of this section, the term 'highest court
of a State' includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals."
The remaining instances of obligatory Supreme Court review include: (i) cases to
which the United States is a party, wherein a federal court declares a federal law unconstitutional, 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976); (ii) cases in which a federal court declares a state statute
unconstitutional, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976); (iii) appeals under 28 US.C. § 1253 of decisions of three-judge courts convened to consider apportionment matters, 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a)
(1976); extraordinary matters arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a5(b), 2000e-6(b) (1976); various cases under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and related statutes, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(g), 1973(b)-(c) (1976); and actions brought under the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. § 9010(c) (1976); (iv) certified questions from the
federal courts of appeals and the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(3), 1255(2) (1976); (v)
appeals from the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 28 U.S.C. § 1258(1)-(2) (1976); (vi) certified
questions from district courts involving construction of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 437h(b) (1976); (vii) actions in the Court of Claims concerning appropriation of certain Indian lands, 25 U.S.C. § 652 (1976), (viii) challenges to
construction authorizations under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1652(d) (1976).
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Part III will assess the effect of Senate bill 3100, outlining and discuss-

ing possible objections to that bill.
I.
A.

Historical Antecedents And Evolution Of The Statutory
Framework
Early Developments
Although the delegates to the Constitutional Convention advanced

a wide variety of proposals concerning the structure of the national judiciary, the record of that gathering demonstrates widespread agreement that the Supreme Court should be vested with the power to
review state court decisions on matters of federal concern.' 5 One participant observed that, in the absence of a supreme national tribunal,
"the judicial authority of the Union may be eluded at the pleasure of
every plaintiff or prosecutor."' 6 Cognizant of this problem and pursu-

ant to its authority under the "exceptions and regulations" clause,' 7 the
first Congress prescribed the appellate authority of the Supreme Court
over state cases in section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.18 Under this

provision, writs of error were to issue to state courts in three situations:
(i) where a state tribunal invalidated a federal statute, treaty or authority; (ii) where a state statute or authority was sustained against a challenge based upon the federal constitution, laws or treaties; and (fi)
where the construction of a federal constitutional, statutory or treaty

provision was called into question, and the title, right, privilege or exemption thereunder was denied by the state court.' 9
15. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 12 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER].
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 at 456 (rev. ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton). See also 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 18 (1926); FRANKFURTER & LAN-

DIS, supra note 7, at 190-91.
17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2: "In all the other Cases, before mentioned, the
supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make."
18. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85-87.
19. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided as follows: "Sec. 25. And be it
furtherenacted, That a final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or
equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the
validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the
decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or
an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a
treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United States, and the decision is against
the title, right, privilege or exemption specially'set up or claimed by either party, under such
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As Professor Warren aptly described it, the 1789 Act was
a measure in the nature of a compromise between the extreme
Federalist view that the full extent of judicial power granted by
the Constitution should be vested by Congress in the Federal
Courts, and the view of those who feared the new Government as
a destroyer of the rights of the States, who wished all suits to be
decided first in the State Courts, and only on appeal by the Federal Supreme Court. 0
In section 25, this compromise was reflected specifically in the selection
of the common law writ of error as the exclusive mode of review. In
the contemporaneous English practice, the writ of error allowed the
courts of King's Bench to review lower court decisions only as to questions of law; the procedure was designed simply to affirm or deny the
existence of error in the trial proceedings." In the courts of Chancery
however, the appeal carried both facts and legal theory to the higher
court. In the absence of trial by jury in equity practice, the appellate
judge was free to consider the facts de novo in determining whether the
chancellor below had arrived at a just result.22 During the ratification
debates on the Constitution, a major attack had been leveled against
the article III provision permitting Supreme Court review of issues of
law and fact. To its antagonists, this broadened scope of review appeared to abrogate the common law practice of commending factual
determinations exclusively to the jury. This criticism not only led to the
inclusion of the Seventh Amendment in the Bill of Rights, but it also
shaped the drafting of section 25. Eager to provide some assurance that
the right to trial by jury would be preserved, the draftsmen of section
25 employed the writ of error and delimited the ambit of Supreme
clause of the said constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error, the
citation being signed by the chief justice, or judge or chancellor of the court rendering or
passing the judgment or decree complained of, or by a justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the same manner and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have
the same effect, as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a
circuit court, and the proceeding upon the reversal shall also be the same, except that the
Supreme Court, instead of remanding the cause for a final decision as before provided, may
at their discretion, if the cause shall have been once remanded before, proceed to a final
decision of the same, and award execution. But no other error shall be assigned or regarded
as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the
record, and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or construction
of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, commissions, or authorities in dispute." Id. (footnotes omitted).
20. Warren, New Light on the History ofthe FederalJudiciaryAct c/'1789, 37 HARV. L.
REv.49, 131 (1923).
21. Sunderland, A Simplfted System ofAppellate Procedure, 17 TEN. L. REv.651, 652
(1943).
22. Id. at 653-54.
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Court review in all cases to questions of law.23
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the utilization of the writ of

error in section 25 was not motivated by considerations of whether or
not the Supreme Court should exercise discretion in reviewing state
court decisions. Although the writ of error in England had for centuries issued ex debitojustiiae,as an obligation of justice, and although
the equity appeal was available only as a matter of royal grace,24 this
distinction played no role in the drafting of section 25. The central
concern was the possible erosion of the right to trial by jury, and the

concept of obligatory review was implanted in the jurisdictional statute
as an accoutrement of proceedings in error, with no real consideration
of the merits of mandatory versus discretionary jurisdiction.
Even though the presence of the writ of error in section 25 embodied only the unitary concern for the scope of Supreme Court review,

the Court in its earliest terms adopted the full panoply of English writ
of error procedures. In 1792, the Court promulgated the following rule:
"The Court considers the practice of the courts of King's Bench and

Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this
court; and that they will, from time to time, make such alterations
therein, as circumstances may render necessary."2 The Court thereby
incorporated the English notion that writs of error issued as of right. It
should be noted that even though the Court embraced the obligatory

aspects of the writ of error, it was not necessarily compelled to do so, as
the eighteenth century experience in the colonies demonstrates. In co-

lonial Connecticut and Virginia, for example, the writ of error was a
23. Warren, New Light on the History ofthe FederalJudiciaryAct of1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV.49, 102 (1923). In 1803, Congress reinstated the practice of reviewing law and fact in
equity and admiralty cases. Act of Mar. 3, 1803, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 244. In the wake of congressional attacks on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the 1950's and 1960's,
some commentators pointed to the use of the writ of error in section 25 as evidence of a
general limitation on congressional power under the exceptions and regulations clause. It
has been argued that the exceptions and regulations clause appeared in article III merely to
provide Congress with a method of limiting the scope of Supreme Court review and that use
of the writ of error in section 25 represented an exercise of this narrow congressional power.
Consequently, it was said to be grossly overstating the case to contend that Congress had
authority to effect fundamental changes in the Court's jurisdiction. Merry, Scope of the
Supreme Court's 4ppellate Jurisdiction: HistoricalBasis, 47 MiNN. L. Rsv. 53, 57, 63-68
(1962).
24. Thompson, The Development of the Anglo-American JudicialSystem, 17 CORNELL
L.Q. 395, 427-29 (1931).
25. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 414 (1792). The English writ of error issued out of the writ office of
Chancery, and since there was no federal chancery, writs of error under section 25 were to
issue out of the Supreme Court clerk's office. West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 400, 401
(1792).
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discretionary writ and not one of right.2 6 In Connecticut, only the
court rendering the judgment complained of could grant a writ of error,
and that would transpire only upon a demonstration of good grounds.
In Virginia, where cases were reviewed by the governor and the judges
of the General Court (the legislature), the reviewing authority could
reject the writ of error as it saw fit.27 Therefore, even though precedent
existed in colonial practice for infusing the common law writ of error
with a measure of judicial discretion, the Court resorted to the more
formalized English version. This coincided with the trend in most state
courts. Although early colonial appellate practice was a variegated
construct of homemade procedures,2" the tendency in the late eighteenth century was toward a more complete acceptance of the English
common law model. This was attributable in large part to the inherent
distrust of courts of equity, especially in New England. At the time of
the Revolution, the writ of error was almost universally regarded in
those jurisdictions which employed it as a writ of right. In the early
nineteenth century, some states proceeded to guarantee it by constitutional provision. Even if proceedings in error were not provided for by
statute, as part of the received common law, actions at law were reviewable as of right by writ of error.2 9
The mandatory nature of the writ of error had its roots firmly entrenched in English jurisprudence. Under the colonial system, the
monarch reserved the right to entertain appeals from colonial courts of
last resort, and, notwithstanding any monetary limitation imposed by
colonial legislatures, the crown regarded the writ of error as an inherent right.3 0 As Justice Story characterized it, the writ of error "was
deemed rather a protection than a grievance" 31 for three apparent
reasons:
(1) That, otherwise, the law appointed or permitted to such inferior dominion might be considerably changed without the assent
of the superior dominion; (2) Judgments might be given to the
disadvantage or lessening of the superiority, or to make the superiority of the king only, and not of the crown of England; and, (3)
That the practice has been accordingly.32
26. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 89 (1941).

27. Id.
28. R. POUND, supra note 26, at 72-105; Frank, HistoricalBases of the FederalJudicial
System, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 5 (1948).
29. R. POUND, supra note 26, at 116.
30. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §

(4th ed. 1873) (citation omitted).
31. Id. § 176.
32. Id. § 175 (citations omitted).

175
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Yet, as the practice developed in the United States, the compulsory nature of proceedings in error stemmed more from the rigidities which cut
across all common law forms of action than from protective notions
derived from the common law. Throughout the nineteenth century, appeal by way of error was an action wholly separate from the proceedings in the trial court. Derived from the ancient action for false
judgment, whereby the trial judge who rendered the allegedly erroneous judgment was made the subject of a semi-criminal action, the writ
33
of error initiated a completely new proceeding in the higher court.
The parties prepared a new set of pleadings, and their positions often
varied from those taken in the lower court. 34 Proceedings in error involved a complicated series of procedural steps, 35 yet the formalities of
common law pleading cut both ways. Although the plaintiff in error
might be frustrated by nonsuit at several stages in the action for the
barest irregularity, once he had complied with all procedural requirements the appellate tribunal had no choice but to hear the case.36
While the Supreme Court adopted the notion that a writ of error
would issue to a state court as a matter of right in a proper case, in
practice, the writ was not allowed simply as a matter of course. 37 Section 25 of the 1789 Act required that the chief judge or judge or chancellor below sign the writ of error coming from the Supreme Court, and
the Court interpreted this to require that an appeal be applied for and
allowed by the lower court. 38 A party whose application for a writ of
error had been denied by the state court could then apply to the justice
who sat in the federal judicial circuit where the state court was situated.
That justice might grant or deny the application or refer it to the entire
Court for consideration.3 9 In Twitchell v. Commonwealth of
33. Sunderland, supra note 21, at 651.
34. R. POUND, supra note 26, at 47.
35. Id. at 47-48; Thompson, supra note 24, at 425 n.525.
36. This is illustrated by an 1884 decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee: "A writ
of error is in the nature of a new suit, and may be obtained as of right by any person entitled
to it, just exactly as he may sue out a summons in an ordinary action upon compliance with
the prescribed requirements. . . . [T]he writ is a matter of right. . . when the party shows
himself entitled to it, whether the applicant can obtain any relief or not." Ridgely v. Bennett, 81 Tenn. 206, 208, 210 (1884) (citations omitted). For similar statements, see McCreary
173 (1874); Ricketson v. Compton, 23
v. Rogers, 35 Ark. 298 (1880); Hall v. Thode, 75 M11.
Cal. 636 (1863); Thompson v. M'Kin, 6 H. & J. 249 (Md. 1825); Skipwith v. Hill, 2 Mass. 35
(1806).
37. R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 377-378 (2d ed., R. Wolfson & P. Kurland ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as
ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM].
38. Havnor v. New York, 170 U.S. 408, 410 (1898).

39.

ROBERTSON

& KIRKHAM, supra note 37, § 378.
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Pennsylvania,40 Chief Justice Chase spoke of the screening function
performed by this procedure:
[W]rits of error to State courts have never been allowed, as of
right. It has always been the practice to submit the record of the
State courts to a judge of this court, whose duty has been to ascertain upon examination whether any question, cognizable here
upon appeal, was made and decided in the proper court of the
State, and whether the case upon the face of the record will justify the allowance of the writ.
In general, the allowance will be made where the decision
appears to have involved a question within our appellate jurisdiction; but refusal to allow the writ is the proper course when no
such question appears to have been made or decided; and also
where, although a claim of right under the Constitution or laws
of the United States may have been made, it is nevertheless clear
that the application for the writ is made under manifest misapprehension as to the jurisdiction of this court. 4 '
In a handful of cases, the Court actually heard oral argument and
wrote opinions on whether the application for the writ should be allowed.4 2 A practice soon developed whereby the Court would reject
the writ would only result in affirmation
the application if allowance of
43
of the state court's decision.
In addition to the foregoing shift in procedures, the Supreme
Court amended its rules in 1876 to provide that when the defendant in
error united a motion to affirm with a motion to dismiss the writ of
error for want of jurisdiction, the Court would generally grant the motion to affirm when the record manifestly demonstrated that the state
court's decision had been correct.' It should be noted, however, that
this and the previously outlined procedures involved an approach quite
different from the certiorari-like treatment that many commentators
contend is accorded appeals today.45 With these early screening techniques, the Court was determining whether the plaintiff in error had
made out a prima facie case under the jurisdictional statute. Most of
these cases presented no federal question whatsoever; no federal statute
had been invalidated and no state law had been challenged on federal
40. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1868).
41. Id. at 324-25. Accord, Butler v. Gage, 138 U.S. 52, 55 (1891); Bartemeyer v. Iowa,
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 26, 27 (1871); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Duzer, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 784
(1869); Gleason v. Florida, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 779, 783 (1869).
42. In re Buchanan, 158 U.S. 31 (1895); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Spies v.
Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
43. ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, supra note 37, § 378.

44. Amendment to Sup. Ct. R. 6, 91 U.S. vii (1876).
45. See notes 88-92 and accompanying text infra.
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grounds. The process of determining whether "a question cognizable
here was made and decided in the State court" 6 is quite distinct from
deciding whether a federal question properly raised below is substantial enough to warrant Supreme Court resolution.
B.

Birth of the Modern Statutory Regime

With the exception of certain variations not central to this discussion, 47 state court decisions were reviewed under section 25 and its suc-

cessor provisions without change for 125 years. In 1914, however,
Congress initiated a series of enactments which brought about a fundamental restructuring of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over
state and federal cases. Whereas review in the nineteenth century had

proceeded almost exclusively by writ of error, these early twentieth
century reforms vested the Court with a greater degree of discretion in
handling its docket. By dividing the cases into two distinct categories

of appellate jurisdiction-mandatory appeal and discretionary certiorari-Congress began to differentiate among various types of cases on
the basis of their national importance. In the process, the category of
cases triggering obligatory review was steadily narrov ed.
In 1911, the New York Court of Appeals held in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co. 48 that the New York workmen's compensation law

constituted a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the state statute had
been invalidated on federal grounds, the case was not cognizable under
section 237 of the Judicial Code (the successor provision to section 25).

Sensitive to the outrage engendered by the merits of the New York
decision, 49 and to the fact that the people of New York were bound by
46. Butler v. Gage, 138 U.S. 52, 55 (1891).
47. In 1867, the last sentence of section 25 was deleted. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, § 28, 14
Stat. 385, 386. That Congress did not intend thereby to enlarge the scope of Supreme Court
review was settled in Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). The 1867
statute was carried over into Rev. Stat. § 709 (1875) without significant change. Section 709
was amended and incorporated into section 237 of the Judicial Code in 1911. Act of Mar. 3,
1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1156.
Two significant developments in the late nineteenth century should be noted. In 1875,
Congress gave the circuit courts federal question jurisdiction. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137,
§ 2, 18 Stat. 470, 471. In 1891, the Evarts Act established the federal circuit courts of appeals. Act of Mar. 3, 189 1, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. Under the Evarts Act, certiorari made its
first appearance in federal practice. Although writs of error still issued to the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court was given certiorari authority over cases based upon diversity,
revenue and patent laws, federal criminal statutes and admiralty law. HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 15, at 40-41.
48. 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
49. 'See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ENLARGEMENT OF THE APPELLATE JURIS-
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an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment "more drastic and restrictive" than that established by any previous Supreme Court opinion,5" Congress enlarged the Court's appellate jurisdiction for the first
and only time since 1789.51 The Act of December 23, 1914, gave the
Court certiorari jurisdiction over cases in which a federal statute,
treaty, authority or right had been sustained in a state court, or in
which a state statute had failed to withstand a federal challenge in a
state court proceeding.52
Although certiorari had, been employed in the Evarts Act5 3 in establishing the federal circuit courts of appeals, the 1914 Act marked the
first appearance of this discretionary mode of review in the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state cases. The legislative history of the statute demonstrates that the decision to use certiorari rather than
obligatory review was based upon a consideration of the relative importance of cases such as Ives. It also indirectly indicates how significant Congress regarded the cases which remained within the
mandatory classification:
The committee considers that this [use of certiorari] will secure a
review in all cases which have any public importance whatever
and at the same time will protect the calendar of the Supreme
Court of the United States from being overburdened with a multitude 54of cases in which appeals are taken for the purposes of
delay.
A second major congressional alteration of the Court's appellate
jurisdiction over the states occurred in 1916. After the Employers'Liabiliy Cases,5 5 the coverage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
turned on whether the injured employee had been engaged in interstate
or intrastate commerce. The difficulty of making this distinction stimulated a spate of litigation in state and lower federal courts. Because
these cases involved complicated factual issues, which were rarely of
any general importance, their review by the Supreme Court placed a
substantial and unnecessary burden on that tribunal's obligatory jurisDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 161, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1914); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING AN ACT ENTITLED "AN ACT
TO CODIFY, REVISE AND AMEND THE LAWS RELATING TO THE JUDICIARY," H.R. REP. No.

1222, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1914).
50. S. REP. No. 161, supra note 49, at 2.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 7, at 198.
Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
S. REP. No. 161, supra note 49, at 2.
207 U.S. 463 (1908).
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diction." Seizing upon the Employers' Liability Cases as a predicate,57
Congress effected a significant curtailment of the Court's obligatory jurisdiction. Under the Act of September 6, 1916, writs of error under
section 237 were available in only two situations: (i) when a federal
authority or constitutional, statutory or treaty provision was stricken
down in a state court; and (ii) when a state law or authority was upheld
against a federal attack.5" All other cases fell within the certiorari category. This was a significant departure from prior practice, for in all
cases involving a title, right, privilege or exemption specially set up
under federal law, the Supreme Court now had certiorari jurisdiction-regardless of how the state court had ruled.
Since the 1916 Act was intended primarily to cure the problem
posed by the Employers' Liability litigation, Congress may not have
completely considered the broader implications of the measure. This
becomes apparent when one realizes that this legislation, which fundamentally altered a jurisdictional framework that had prevailed since
1789, passed through both houses without debate.5 9 Nevertheless, the
Senate report accompanying the bill shows that the basic distinctions
drawn by the statute were grounded upon the national significance of
certain kinds of cases:
This section [addressed to state appeals] leaves unchanged the
absolute right to sue out writs of error in the first two classes of
cases provided for by Section 237, and it permits in all other cases
from State courts which may now be reviewed by the Supreme
Court to be brought up by certiorari only. A great number of
cases included within the terms of the third class but not of general importance are being brought to the Supreme Court. This is
especially true of suits based upon the Employers' Liability Act.
Many of these cases ought not to be reviewed; the delays are unfortunate, and the time that should be devoted to important subjects is much trenched upon.6"
The 1916 Act temporarily diminished the, stream of cases coming
to the Supreme Court by writ of error, but the period after the First
56. This additional burden was reflected in the number of cases on the Court's docket,
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supranote 7, at 205-

which grew from 509 in 1910 to 647 in 1916.
06.

57. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, RELIEF OF THE SUPREME COURT, S. REP.
No. 775, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1916); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDMENT OF
JUDICIAL CODE IN RELATION TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, H.R. REP. No. 794,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1916).
58. Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, 39 Stat. 726.
59. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 7, at 213.
60. S. RP. No. 775, supra note 57, at 2.
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World War witnessed a dramatic rise in the Court's caseload. 6' The
extensive cancellation of government war contracts and the new prohi-

bition laws contributed prolifically to the crush of litigation, especially
in federal courts. By the beginning of the October, 1925, Term, the
appellate backlog in the Supreme Court had reached crisis proportions.
Cases on writ of error accounted for better than eighty per cent of the
Court's calendar,6 2 and delays of eighteen to twenty-four months between docketing and oral argument were not uncommon.6 3

Chief Justice Taft had campaigned vigorously for comprehensive
judicial reform before coming to the Court, 64 and upon his appointment in 1921, he called upon a committee of the justices to assist in
drafting remedial legislation.6 5 Under the guidance of Justice Van Devanter, the committee focused on two particular facets of writ of error
practice: (i) the time absorbed by cases which, after oral argument,
turned solely on questions of jurisdiction and (ii) the ease with which
the writ of error could become an instrument of delay.66 The screening
mechanisms which evolved during the nineteenth century67 had deteri-

orated. Most state judges approved applications for writs of error with
little more than perfunctory examination of the case; a great number of
meritless appeals found their way to the docket, and their frivolity was

not revealed until oral argument.6"
The successful operation of certiorari under the Evarts Act had a
61. In the 1916 Term, the Court decided 157 cases on error to state courts; by 1920, the
number had dwindled to 75. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 7, at 255. In 1916, 1169
cases were docketed and 637 were disposed of during the session. In 1925, the figures were
1282 and 844 respectively. Id. at 256 n.5.
62. Burton, "Judging is Also Administration'" An Appreciatic7 of Constructive
Leadersh, 33 A.B.A. J. 1099, 1102 (1947).
63. Gressman, Much Ado About Certiorari,52 GEO. L.J. 742, 748 n.23 (1964).
64. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure,5 Ky. L.J. 3 (1916). In this
address, the Chief Justice indicated what he felt the Court's obligatory jurisdiction should be
confined to: "[Tihe only jurisdiction that [the Supreme Court] should be obliged to exercise,
and which a litigant may, as a matter of course, bring to the court, should be questions of
constitutional construction. By giving an opportunity to litigants in all other cases to apply
for a writ of certiorari to bring any case from a lower court to the Supreme Court, so that it
may exercise absolute and arbitrary discretion with respect to all business but constitutional
business, will enable the court so to restrict its docket that it can do all its work, and do it
well." Id. at 18.
65. The committee originally consisted of Justices McReynolds and Day, and Chief
Justice White as member ex officio. Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland were added by
Chief Justice Taft. Burton, supra note 62, at 1102 n.19.
66. Procedurein FederalCourts. Hearingson S.2060 andS.2061 B.4'rea Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26, 34 (1924) (statement of
Justice Van Devanter) [hereinafter cited as Judges' Bill Hearings].
67. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
68. Judges' Bill Hearings,supra note 66, at 26.
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profound effect upon the committee of justices; they approached their
task free of the conservative view that the Supreme Court should be the
only source of finality. As a result, the Act of February 13, 1925,69 also
known as the Judges' Bill, liberally employed certiorari as a substitute
for great portions of the Court's obligatory jurisdiction. Of the fourteen classes of federal court cases which had previously qualified for
writ of error, only five remained." As the report prepared by the justices stressed, the central theme of the Judges' Bill was the conservation
of the Supreme Court as the arbiter of issues of national importance:
The primary object of the bill is to relieve the congestion resulting from the present overcrowded docket of the Supreme Court,
and thus enable a more expeditious disposition of the cases which
that court is called upon to decide, by restricting the obligatory
appellate jurisdiction of the court to cases and proceedings of a
character and importance which render a review of right in the
Supreme Court desirable from the public point of view.7 '
Although the Judges' Bill concentrated principally on shutting the
doors of the Court to federal cases of minor importance, the legislation
also touched upon writs of error issued to state courts. The 1925 Act
carred over the framework established in 1916 with one further contraction. 72 Under the 1916 law, cases in which the "validity" of a federal authority had been challenged were deemed to merit review by
writ of error; while situations involving an "exercise" of the same authority were reviewable only by certiorari. In the interest of clarity, the
Judges' Bill placed both cases under the certiorari heading. 73 In addition, an amendment was added to minimize the significance of the hazy
distinction between certiorari and writ of error. Since 1916, attorneys
who were uncertain as to which route to pursue frequently employed
certiorari and writ of error simultaneously. The 1925 Act permitted
review by either method in cases of overlapping jurisdiction.7 4
69. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
70. Obligatory jurisdiction now only extended to: (i) equity actions brought by the
United States to enforce the Interstate Commerce Act and the antitrust laws; (ii) criminal
cases brought by the United States where the government loses and where the defendant has
not been acquitted or exposed to jeopardy; (iii) interlocutory injunctions against enforcement of a state statute or against the exercise of a state authority; (iv) interlocutory and final
decrees of injunctions and suspensions of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission;
(v) cases in the courts of appeals involving invalidation of a state statute. Id.
71. Judges'BillHearings,supra note 66, at 6-7. See also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JURISDICTION OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE SUPREME COURT, H.R.
REP. No. 1075, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1925).
72. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 937.
73. Taft, The Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court under theAct ofFebruary13, 1925, 35
YALE L.J. 1, 8-9 (1925).
74. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 7, at 276.
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The Judges' Bill marked the culmination of efforts, begun in 1914,
to identify a class of cases which, in light of the Court's burgeoning
caseload, were important enough to call for mandatory review. Some
commentators have suggested.that the certiorari/appeal distinction is
"no more than an historical accident, stemming from the fact that the
appeal provision was a feature of the original jurisdictional scheme,
while certiorari was introduced relatively late in the Court's history."7 5
The Senate debates 76 on the Judges' Bill do not support this argument.
Indeed, they indicate that Congress was not only aware of the residuum
of cases left in the obligatory category, but made that classification
based upon what were conceived to be important considerations of federalism. This conclusion is borne out by the debate over cases coming
from circuit courts of appeals in which a state statute had been invalidated. The original draft of the Judges' Bill gave the Supreme Court
no obligatory jurisdiction over the courts of appeals. When the measure reached the Senate floor, Senator Copeland of New York suggested
that this might create a disparity in view of the two classes of
mandatory jurisdiction over state decisions. Quoting from a report prepared by an advisor, he observed that "'the bill gives the circuit court
of appeals appellate jurisdiction and makes it the court of last resort in
an important class of cases in which a State supreme court is in effect
only an intermediate tribunal.'"" Senator Copeland then read into
the record certain correspondence he had conducted with Chief Justice
Taft. Because Senator Copeland believed the Judges' Bill raised the
dignity of the courts of appeals over that of the state courts, he proffered two solutions: (i) permit a writ of error to issue to a court of
appeals when a state statute has been overturned; or (ii) make all
Supreme Court review discretionary. Rejecting both suggestions, the
Chief Justice sought to justify the distinction contained in the original
bill:
We would have been glad to make the same rule requiring certiori to permit review of State decisions and would be glad now to
have the rule uniform as to the two courts, but we felt that there
would be objection if one interested in the validity of a Federal
treaty or statute set aside by a State court could not of right come
to our court or where against a claim of conflict with the Federal
Constitution the State court had affirmed the validity of a State
75. Note, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the Supreme Courtfor Want of a
SubstantialFederalQuestion: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 70 COLUM. L. REV.

508, 514-15 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Hicks v. Miranda].
76. In contrast, in the House of Representatives, "[a] few minutes of desultory discussion led to its passage in the first instance." FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, s7upra note 7, at 279.
77. 66 CONG. REc. 2921 (1925).
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statute. On the other hand, with respect to a decision of a circuit
court of appeals on a similar question such a court would be
more likely to preserve the Federal view of the issue than the
of its
State court, at least to an extent to justify making a review
78
decision by our court conditioned upon our approval.
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Taft's remarks, the Senate adopted the
first of Senator Copeland's solutions. According to Senator Walsh, the
Senate thereby
intended to put the two on a perfect parity, allowing a writ of
error from the circuit court of appeals under conditions exactly
the same except reversed, and allowing a writ of certiorari in the
one case as in the other case, so that the two would be entirely
harmonious.7 9

The foregoing discussion illustrates that the final version of the
Judges' Bill was more than a one-dimensional response to the problems
of the Court's caseload. Indeed, had that been the only consideration,
Congress might very well have pursued Senator Copeland's suggestion

and made all review discretionary through certiorari. Chief Justice
Taft indicated that he might have advanced such a solution had he not
anticipated serious political resistance.8 " The same could be said of the
Senate's action, but the statute that emerged embodied more than mere
political expediency. The final legislation represented an effort to relieve the heavy burden on the Court, but in a way that remained attuned to those important issues of federalism which arise when a state

court invalidates a federal statute or sustains its own law, or when a
federal court strikes down a state law. 8 '

78. Id. at 2922.
79. Id. at 2923.
80. At the outset, the Chief Justice was faced with substantial opposition from the Senate Judiciary Committee, the members of which had reservations about the degree of judicial participation in the drafting process. Chief Justice Taft's remarks to Senator Copeland
may indicate that although he favored dispensing with obligatory review altogether, he did
not press the point for fear that the reforms which had been included in the bill would not
pass through Congress. For a background discussion of the political history of the Judges'
Bill, see A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, CHIEF JUSTICE 109-13 (1964).
81. The observations of Senator George evince the tone of the 1925 law: "Under the
general scheme contemplated in this act. . . and as it has manifested itself from the time of
the enactment of the judiciary act in 1789 to the present, the citizen asserting a right under a
State law has preserved to him the right to maintain the dignity of his own constitution.
Similarly, the citizen asserting that the Federal Constitution is being undermined has had
the right preserved to him to maintain that Constitution. In other words, the whole system
of review has constantly in mind this principle-that the State could not destroy the Federal
Constitution and the Federal courts could not destroy the State laws. There is a balance
there, and there is not an unrestricted right of appeal, and there never has been an unrestricted right of appeal as a matter of right.
"Perhaps it would have been wisest and best in the beginning to have left all decisions,
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A few technical changes following the enactment of the Judges'
Bill completed the statutory evolution. In 1928, the term "appeal" was
substituted for "writ of error" without substantively altering the statute.82 In that same year, the Court promulgated Rule 12 of the Rules
of the Supreme Court, which was designed to differentiate between
frivolous and meritorious appeal.8" By requinng an appellant to file a
jurisdictional statement, Rule 12 enabled the Court to determine, on

the basis of the papers, whether an appeal raised an issue worthy of its
consideration. In 1936, the Court amended Rule 12 to reflect its already well established practice of hearing only those appeals presenting

substantial federal questions.84 This amendment, however, provided
no definition of the word "substantial." The foregoing developments,
together with the Judges' Bill, form the bases of the Supreme Court's

appellate practice today.
II. Problems In Current Practice
A.

Has Obligatory Appellate Jurisdiction Vanished?
In theory, certiorari and appeal encompass different factors.

either of State courts or of lower Federal courts to review on writs of ccrtiorari. That was
the logical process. But there was the apprehension that the State courts might not be duly
regardful of rights under the Federal Constitution, and therefore when there was a decision
in a State court sustaining a law which was said to be violative of the Federal Constitution,
the Supreme Court of the United States had the right to review that decision.
"In a broad way, we naturally think that a litigant should have the unrestricted right of
appeal, whether the decision be for or against the validity of the law, but when we think of it
from a practical point of view, since there must be some restriction of the right of appeal
because it is always possible to bring a Federal question into any sort of litigation-since
there must be some restrictions growing out of the practical necessities, it seems that these
restrictions are justified." 66 CoNG. REC. 2924 (1925).
82. Act of Jan. 31, 1928, cl. 14, 45 Stat. 54, as amendedby Act of Apc. 26, 1928, ch. 440,
45 Stat. 466.
83. Sup. Ct. R. 12, 275 U.S. 603, 603-04 (1928) (amended by Sup. Ct. R. 15, 398 U.S.
1024, 1024-27 (1970)).
84. 297 U.S. 733 (1936). This practice was derived from cases such vs Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710, 717 (1923); Zucht v. King, 2o0 U.S. 174, 176-77
(1922); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308 (1902). Scegenerally Ulman
& Spears, "Dismissedfor Want ofa SubstantialFederalQuestion," 20 B., L. REv. 501, 51423 (1940); Wiener, The Supreme Court's New Rules, 68 HARV. L. REX. 20, 29-30 (1954);
Note, The InsubstantialFederalQuestion, 62 HARV. L. REV. 488, 489-91 (1949).
85. In 1926, section 237 of the Judicial Code was carried into 28 U.S.C. § 344 without
change. Act of June 26, 1926, ch. 9, § 344, 44 Stat., pt. I, 1, 906. By the Act of June 25, 1948,
Title 28 of the U.S.C. was revised to produce the current 28 U.S.C. § 1257(l)-(3) (1976). Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869. A 1970 amendment provided that the term "highest
court of a State" would include the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 173, 84
Stat. 590.
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While certiorari review in practice is limited to cases presenting conflicts among lower courts or issues of general importance, review by
appeal tends to have a broader sweep, taking in cases as long as they do
not involve settled issues, are not frivolous or are of consequence to
others besides the individual parties.8 6 Perhaps, again only in theory,
the two types of review pose quite distinct problems for the litigant.
With certiorari, a petitioner must not only convince the Court that the
case ought to be heard on the merits, but if that requirement is satisfied,
he must show that the case warrants plenary consideration. An appellant does not face the first obstacle, for once the statutory criteria are
met the decision whether or not to grant review on the merits is foreclosed by congressional direction. The appellant's task is thus reduced
to that of persuading the Court to give his appeal plenary
consideration.87
Despite these theoretical dissimilarities, the enormous growth in
the Court's workload and its evolving tactics of "self-defense" have
somewhat blurred the certiorari/appeal distinction.88 Chief Justice
Marshall once declared that the Court has "no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not
given."89 Recent experience, however, casts considerable doubt on the
present viability of the Chief Justice's pronouncement. Today, it is frequently argued that eliminating the appeal/certiorari distinction would
conform theory to practice because the Court has assimilated essentially all of the certiorari criteria into the standards for the disposition
of appeals. As Francis R. Kirkham has stated:
With few exceptions, the Court--driven by sheer necessity to ration justice-has taken upon itself to rewrite the statute [dealing
with obligatory review] and to treat most appeals as the
equivalent of petitions for certiorari, subject only to discretionary
review. With few exceptions, these appeals, without hearing, are
86. Symposium, Should the Appellate Jurisdictionof the United States Supreme Court Be
Changed? An Evaluation of the FreundReport Proposals, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 878, 890
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Rutgers Symposium]; Note, Summary Disposition of Supreme
Court Appeals The Signflcance ofLimited Discretion and a Theory of Limited Precedent,52
B.U. L. REv. 373, 394-95 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Summary Disposition]. Compare
Sup. Ct. R. 19 with Sup. Ct. R. 15.
87. Rutgers Symposium, supra note 86, at 890; Note, Summary Disposition,supra note
86, at 395.
88. Today, the jurisdictional statement and the petition for certiorari perform largely
the same screening function by forcing the appellant or petitioner to make out a compelling
case for review in a few pages. The 1967 amendments to the Supreme Court Rules also
placed appeal and certiorari on the same time schedule. Boskey & Gressman, The 1967
Changes in the Supreme Court's Rules, 42 F.R.D. 139, 142 (1967).
89. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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affirmed or are dismissed with only90the routine phrase "for want
of a substantial Federal question."
Concurring in this analysis, Dean Griswold also points out that virtually every case heard in the Supreme Court arrives there solely by the
grace of that tribunal. 9 ' Both appellate and original jurisdiction have
become subject to discretionary control; in the latter context, the Court
has declined to hear cases which fall squarely within its original
jurisdiction.9 2
One of the strongest arguments supporting the view that appeals
have become discretionary is based on the manner in which the Court
has used the concept of substantiality. For quite some time, the Court
has insisted that cognizable appeals raise substantial federal questions,
but it has never defined the term "substantial." The vague parameters
of substantiality have led some commentators to conclude that the concept is wholly subjective and therefore discretionary. 93 Yet despite this
lack of definition, substantiality involves no greater mix of subjective
and objective factors than that involved in any case where a judge must
apply an abstract rule of law to concrete facts. It certainly does not
afford the Court license to resort to the full range of certiorari considerations. Justice Frankfurter's characterization of substantiality, suggesting the presence of a limited form of discretion, is particularly
instructive:
Plainly, the criterion of substantiality is neither rigid nor narrow.
The play of discretion is inevitable, and wherever discretion is
operative in the work of the Court the pressure of the docket is
bound to sway its exercise. To the extent that there are reasonable differences of opinion as to the solidity of a question
presented for decision or the conclusiveness of prior rulings, the
90. National Court of Appeals Act: Hearings on S. 2762 and S. S423 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. onithe Judiciary, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 117, 120 (1976) (statement of Francis R. Kirkham) [hereinafter cited as JudicialImprovement Hearings]. For similar positions, see Black, The Natio.,alCourt ofAppeals:
An Unwise Proposal,83 YALE L. J. 883, 887-88 (1974); Frank, The United States Supreme
Court: 1950-1951, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 165, 231 (1952); Moore & Vestal, Present andPotential
Role of Certofcation in FederalAppellate Procedure,35 VA. L. REv. 1. 44-45 (1949); Poe,
Schmidt & Whalen, A National Court of Appeals. A Dissenting View, 67 Nw. L. REv. 842,
842 (1973); Strong, The Time Has Come to Talk ofMajor Curtailmentin the Supreme Court'r

Jurisdiction,48 N.C. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1969).
91. JudicialImprovement Hearings,supra note 90, at 67 (statement of Erwin H. Griswold). See also Griswold, supra note 4, at 345.
92. See United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534 (1973); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
93. JudicialImprovement Hearings,supra note 90, at 67 (statement of Erwin H. Griswold); Griswold, supra note 4, at 345; Note, The InsubstantialFederalQu1estion, 62 HARv.L.
REv. 488, 492 (1949).
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administration of Rule 12 [now Rule 15] operates to subject the
obligatory jurisdiction of the Court to discretionary considerations not unlike those governing certiorari. 4

Another aspect of appellate practice related to substantiality and
bearing upon the issue of discretion is illustrated by Rescue Army v.
MunicialCourt.9 5 The Court in Rescue Army admittedly had jurisdiction over the appeal, but it nevertheless declined to decide the case.
Referring to the principles outlined by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,96 Justice Rutledge dismissed the case without prejudice because he felt the opinion of the state court had left
unclear its construction of the challenged state statute. 97 This deviation
from obligatory review may have been justified on the ground that appellant in Rescue Army was not running the risk of having coercive
governmental action taken directly against him. In this context, postponement for clarification of the record and granting appellant the option to return seem reasonable.
In two decisions since Rescue Army, however, the Court may have
extended the doctrine of that case beyond its intended scope. In Poe v.
Ullman," the Court invoked Rescue Army to avoid rendering a decision even though there was no doubt what construction the lower court
had given the Connecticut statute regulating the use of contraceptives.
Justice Frankfurter relied heavily upon the fact that prosecutions under
the law had been rare.9 9 In Naim v. Naim," the Court dismissed an
94. Frankfurter & Landis, The Businessofthe Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1930). After the Supreme Court promulgated Rule 12, Justice (then
Professor) Frankfurter observed: "This [Rule 12 requirement of substantiality] serves formal notice of the discretionary ingredient even in review as of right. A claim of unsubstantiality inevitably invokes judgment, even in those cases where the question is whether its
solidity has evaporated in the course of prior decisions." Frankfurter & Fisher, The Business
of the Supreme Court at the October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REv. 577, 583-84
(1938).
95. 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
96. 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, I., concurring).
97. 331 U.S. at 578-82. For a recent case adopting an approach similar to that taken in
RescueArmy, see Southern & N. Overlying Carrier Chapters of the Cal. Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Public Util. Comnm'n of Cal., 434 U.S. 9 (1977).
The doctrine of Rescue Army is generally related to justiciability concepts such as ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1581-652 (9th ed. 1975). To the extent that the Court
is employing these concepts in closing its doors, they are related indirectly to the matter of
discretion in the disposition of appeals. However, since Rescue Army is more closely connected as a gloss on the jurisdictional statute itself, it was included in this study and the
other ideas are regarded as peripheral.
98. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
99. Id. at 502-09.
100. 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
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appeal from a conviction under a Virginia miscegenation statute because of an "inadequate record," even though clearly substantial federal questions were raised and even though appellant faced immediate,
coercive governmental action.101 Fortunately, dispositions such as
these have been rare.
A third major indicium of discretion in the disposition of appeals
is embodied in the "rule of four." In order to obtain plenary consideration, an appellant must secure the affirmative votes of at least four justices. The origins of the rule of four are unclear, but it was first
publicly articulated by Justice Van Devanter in the hearings on the
Judges' Bill.' 02 Initially employed by the Court in processing petitions
for certiorari, the rule now also applies to appeals.103 The rule of four
infuses the appellate process with a degree of discretion: to the extent
that six justices can vote against noting probable jurisdiction, the Court
has introduced a limited, discretionary avoidance of full consideration
of the issues presented."m If briefing and oral argument would have
made any difference in the decision to decline review, then a certain
amount of arbitrariness has crept into the procedure.
The opinions and public statements of the justices vary and are
inconclusive as to the exact measure of discretion present in the disposition of appeals. In a frequently cited speech to the American Law
Institute in 1954, Chief Justice Warren asserted:
It is only accurate to a degree to say that our jurisdiction in cases
on appeal is obligatory as distinguished from discretionary on
certiorari. As regards appeals from state courts our jurisdiction is
limited to those cases which present substantial federal questions.
In the absence of what we consider substantiality in the light of
prior decisions, the appeal will be dismissed without opportunity
for oral argument.' 0
More recently, Justice Clark stated that while he served on the Court,
"appeals from state court decisions received treatment similar to that
101. Id. The issues in Poe and Naim were indeed substantial, for the Court later declared the same statutes unconstitutional in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), respectively.
102. Hearingson H.R. 8206 Before the House JudiciaryCommittee, osth Cong., 2d Sess.
(1925) (testimony of Justice Van Devanter). See Leiman, The Rule of Four,57 COLUM. L.
REv. 975, 981 (1957).
103. Ohio ex. rel Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959); R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.16 (5th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as STERN & GRESSMAN].
104. See Note, Summary Disposition,supranote 86, at 398.
105. Address by Chief Justice Warren, American Law Institute (May 19, 1954), quotedin
Wiener, The Supreme Court'sNew Rules, 68 HARV. L. REV. 20, 51 (1954).
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accorded petitions for certiorari."'' 1 6 Generally concurring in this appraisal, Justice Brennan has observed that "behind our summary dispositions of appeals lie many of the same considerations that account for
denials of certiorari."'' 0 7 In this regard, it is useful to note that recent
cases have shown greater resort to certiorari-like factors in the noting of
probable jurisdiction. 0 8 Perhaps indicative of the position of other
members of the Court, Justice Rehnquist has characterized the Court's
task as not that of uncovering the meritorious request for review, but of
choosing a limited number of cases from a pool of several hundred, "all
of which have arguably strong claims."' 9 Other members of the Court
have recognized more force in the certiorari/appeal distinction, however. Justice Douglas has contended that the large number of appeals
summarily decided "does not mean that the Court has converted an
obligatory jurisdiction into a discretionary one. It means merely that
the fields involved in these appeals do not need the delineation that was
once necessary. ' 1 0
The preceding discussion suggests that a degree of discretion has
crept into the disposition of appeals; however, the extent of discretion is
hard to determine. Theoretically, the Court should be exercising discretion only in deciding whether to permit counsel to submit briefs and
engage in oral argument. Yet it is probably safe to assume that every
docketing decision, regardless of the type of case, is somewhat colored
by the reality that practical limitations will compel rejection of most
requests for review. It is difficult to determine whether the Court has
made a practical equation between certiorari and appeal. Although
often cited as evidence of such an equation, Chief Justice Warren's
1954 American Law Institute address merely states that while appeal
may lie as of right, it does not necessarily include the right to oral argument or to a full opinion. This is more than a mere subtlety, considering that dispositions of appeals, unlike denials of certiorari, are
adjudications on the merits."'
It seems fair to say that despite the concept of substantiality, the
doctrine of Rescue Army and the rule of four, the Court approaches
appeals and petitions for certiorari differently. The reticence of the
106. Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 913
(1976) (Clark, J., concurring; sitting by designation).
107. Sidle v. Majors, 429 U.S. 945, 948 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1976); Memorial Hospital
v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253 (1974).
109. Rehnquist, supra note 3, at 789.
110. Douglas, supra note 5, at 411.
I 11. See notes 119-25 and accompanying text infra.
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Court to make a straightforward statement of what it is actually doing
is at best ambiguous. It could be inferred that the Court is enforcing
the appellate statute according to its letter, but this is undoubtedly naive in light of the very compelling cases which have failed to negotiate
the gauntlet of substantiality." 2 Something more than literal application of the statute is obviously involved. It is also arguable that the
justices have covertly subsumed the review of all cases under one discretionary heading and have skirted the matter in their opinions to
avoid the appearance of deliberately subverting the legislative command. This serious allegation has been disputed by at least one commentator. 13 For the litigant, his assessment of how much discretion
the Court will employ should probably be made in this manner: The
appellant begins with a theoretically absolute right to review which the
Court has made more inaccessible through an exercise of limited discretion. The petitioner however, knows that his papers will be treated
with a maximum of discretion, although the basic guidelines contained
in Rule 19 and interpretive cases prevent that disposition from becoming completely arbitrary.
B. The Precedential Value of a Summary Disposition
Apart from plenary consideration, appeals coming from lower
courts meet with five possible fates: (i) dismissal for want of jurisdiction; (ii) remand; (iii) summary reversal; (iv) dismissal for want of a
substantial federal question; or (v) summary affirmance. Dismissals for
want of jurisdiction and remands are the least controversial, for they
enable the Court to winnow out the appeals in which jurisdiction is
lacking or in which other factors should have been considered below." 4
As with denials of certiorari, they have no effect on the merits of the
case." 5 Although summary reversals are adjudications on the merits,
they are infrequently used. The Court will not usually resort to this
method unless it believes the lower court's opinion to be frivolous or in
clear conflict with a decision directly on point."I6 In addition, the summary reversal imparts an element of unfairness, for the Supreme Court
112. See notes 126-27 and accompanying text infra.
113. See, e.g., Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court: Reflections on
the Law andLogisticsofDirectReview, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043 (1977). "It is simply
inadmissible that the highest court of law should be lawless in relation to its own jurisdiction." Id. at 1061.
114. Rutgers Symposium, supra note 86, at 958.
115. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 914 n.l (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
116. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 103, at § 5.19.
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Rules provide no warning to the unwary appellee who neglects to file
papers in opposition." 7 The fourth and fifth categories, however, have
engendered a heated debate and have become prime focal points for
those who would abolish obligatory jurisdiction. 1 8
. The rule in Hicks v. Miranda
In Miller v. Calfornia (Miller1), the Supreme Court dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question an appeal from a state court
challenging a state obscenity statute. A year later, a three-judge district
court was presented with an attack on the same law and, failing to find
any significance in the Miller II dismissal, declared the statute unconstitutional. In Hicks v. Miranda,20 the Supreme Court reversed the
three-judge panel and prescribed the governing rule:
[T]he District Court was in error in holding that it could disregard the decision in Miller 1I. That case was an appeal from a
decision by a state court upholding a state statute against federal
constitutional attack. A federal constitutional issue was properly
presented, it was within our appellate jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(2), and we had no discretion to refuse adjudication
of the case. on its merits as would have been true had the case
been brought here under our certiorari jurisdiction. We were not
obligated to grant the case plenary consideration, and we did not;
but we were required to deal with its merits. We did so by concluding that the appeal should be dismissed because the constitutional challenge to the California statute was not a substantial
one. The three-judge court was not free to disregard this
pronouncement.
As a result, dismissals for want of a substantial federal question are
adjudications on the merits and, under the supremacy clause, 2 2 bind
state and lower federal courts as completely as full opinions.
The principal effect of Justice White's majority opinion in Hicks
was to resolve the debate among state and lower federal courts over the
deference which should be accorded the summary disposition of cases
reaching the Supreme Court under its obligatory jurisdiction. At the
same time, however, Justice White endeavored to restrict the broad implications of the Hicks rule. In a footnote, he indicated that a summary
117. Id.; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 647.
118. JudicialImprovement Hearings, supra note 90, at 273-74 (statement of Paul A.
Freund); id. at 93 (statement of Justice Goldberg); RutgersSymposium, supra note 86, at 969;
Note, Hicks v. Miranda,supra note 75, at 527.

119. 418 U.S. 915 (1974).
120. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
121. Id. at 343-44.
122. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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disposition should control in a subsequent case only if the issues in
both cases are "sufficiently the same." 123 A lower court must discern
"what issues had been properly presented . . . and declared by this
Court to be without substance."'' 24 Unfortunately, this qualification
has gone largely unnoticed, and the major emphasis has been upon the
25
strongly worded passage in the text of the opinion.
2. Problems generatedby Hicks v. Miranda
The rule of Hicks has spawned a wide spectrum of difficulties and
has become the focus of critical comment by scholars, lower court
judges and even members of the Court. One question, present before
the decision in Hicks and perhaps made more critical by that ruling, is
whether the summary disposition is a proper mode of decision. Nearly
twenty years ago, Professor Hart, observing the increased frequency in
dismissals for want of a substantial federal question, remarked,
[I]t has long since become impossible to defend the thesis that all
the appeals which the Court dismisses on this ground are without
substance. And any pretense that jurisdictional statements are
concerned only with jurisdiction vanished when the Court began
12
to affirm and even reverse judgments on the basis of them.
This statement appears no less accurate today. In Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 127 the Court affirmed the decision of a three-judge
panel rejecting the challenge to a Virginia sodomy law, tendered by a
group of homosexuals. Major constitutional issues were presented in
the case, but the Court's disposition indicates that the question was so
clear that briefing and oral argument were not necessary.
Summary dispositions of state appeals such as Doe carry an institutional ambiguity that the rule in Hicks only compounds. When the
Supreme Court determines that a state appeal presents no substantial
federal question, substantiality may assume one of two meanings: either (i) appellant has not demonstrated the existence of a nonfrivolous
federal question in his case; or (ii) there is a cognizable federal question, but the Court agrees with its disposition below. A dismissal of
cases of the first variety for want of jurisdiction would obviate confusion, but the Court has dismissed both types for want of a substantial
123. 422 U.S. at 345 n.14.
124. Id.
125. Note, The PrecedentialEffect of Summary Affirmances and Dismz.sals/or Want ofa

Substantial Federal Question by the Supreme Court after Hicks v. Mirrdaand Mandel v.
Bradley, 64 VA. L. RaV. 117, 122 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sum mary Affrmances].
126. Hart, The Supreme Court-1958 Term-Foreword The Time C4iart of the Justices,
73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 89 n.13 (1959).
127. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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federal question.1 28 This treatment of state appeals should be contrasted with that accorded appeals from the lower federal courts. If the
Court believes the federal question to be insubstantial, in that it agrees
with the decision below, it will summarily affirm, even though the same
issue would have warranted a dismissal had it appeared in a case appealed from a state court. This anomaly has largely historical origins,
but it is partially explicable on jurisdictional grounds. To avoid a dismissal, an appellant in a state court must clear two hurdles by showing:
(i) that the federal question is substantial, and (ii) that it merits plenary
consideration.1 29 The federal appellant, however, need only overcome
the second barrier, for the existence of a federal question is assumed.
Therefore, with the summary affirmance, the Court may effectively
screen clearly colorless federal appeals without having to determine
vwhether the federal question was one meeting the requirements for invocation of the lower court's original federal question jurisdiction. 130
Even if the Court were to abandon the illogical terminology employed in its disposition of state and federal appeals which do not call
for plenary consideration, the precedential force conferred by Hicks
still has the potential for creating uncertainty. When a lower court's
opinion rests on several alternative grounds, it is no simple task to discern the exact basis for the Court's decision to dismiss or affirm. Examination of the jurisdictional statement often provides little guidance in
view of the Supreme Court practice of construing the statement to include "every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein."1 31 Additionally, in light of the functioning of the rule of four, no clear rationale
can emerge when six justices can vote to dispose of the case summarily
without agreeing on the grounds. Empathizing with state and federal
judges who are faced with the prospect of unravelling the holding of a
summary disposition, Justice Brennan has observed:
When presented with the contention that our unexplained dispositions are conclusively binding, puzzled state and lower court
judges are left to guess as to the meaning and scope of our unexplained dispositions. We ourselves have acknowledged that summary dispositions are "somewhat opaque,"
.
32

deny that they have sown confusion.

and we cannot

128. Note, The Signicance of Dismissals "For Want of a SubstantialFederalQuestion'"

OriginalSin in the FederalCourts, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 785, 786-87 (1968).
129. Sup. CT. R. 15(e).
130. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 103, at § 5.18; Rutgers Symposium, supra note 86,
at 959.
131. Sup. Ct. R. 15(c).
132. Colorado Springs Amusements, Ltd. v. Rizzo, 428 U.S. 913, 919 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted).
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Although the basis for a summary decision may be fairly ascertainable in some instances, 33 the binding effect prescribed by Hicks
may foreclose any further dialogue on the particular matter among
state and lower federal courts. Several federal courts have expressly

foregone consideration of what they regarded as meritorious federal
issues because similar claims had been raised in prior appeals to the
Supreme Court, only to be dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question. 34 Precluding debate among lower courts on important constitutional issues is a consequence that should follow only when the
Supreme Court announces3 what is to become the law of the land in a

fully considered opinion. 1
A further difficulty engendered by Hicks and closely related to the
problem of foreclosing dialogue is that of overgeneralization. Con-

133. The rule in Hicks has functioned fairly satisfactorily in cases applying summary
dispositions wherein the jurisdictional statement raised a single, well-defined issue. In Amos
v. Sims, 409 U.S. 942 (1972), the Court summarily affirmed a decision awarding attorney's
fees in actions against a state or state officer acting in his official capacity. Inferring that
Sims was based on a determination that such awards do not transgress the Eleventh Amendment, other courts have permitted similar awards. Bond v. Stanton, 528 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.),
vacated & remanded on othergrounds, 429 U.S. 973 (1976); Newman %.Alabama, 522 F.2d
71 (5th Cir. 1975); Gates v. Collier, 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
Similarly, in Kimbell, Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 429 U.S. S04 (1976), appellant
argued that federal labor laws had preempted the field, prohibiting states from granting
unemployment compensation to striking employees. The appeal was dismissed for want of a
substantial federal question. Viewing as the predicate for the Kimbell dismissal the conclusion that federal labor policy did not preclude the payment of such compensation, other
courts have sustained similar laws. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor,
566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 435 U.S. 941 (1978); Super Tire Eng'r Co. v.
McCorkle, 550 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977). For other cases employing the Hicks rationale in similar fashion, see Government of Virgin Islands v. 19.623 Acres
of Land, 536 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1976); Americans United for the Separation of Church and
State v. Blanton, 433 F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn.), afdmem., 434 U.S. 803 (1977). For additional citations on the same point, see Note, Summary Affirmances, supra note 125, at 124-25.
134. In Sidle v. Majors, 536 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 945 (1976), the
court refused to consider the constitutionality of a state guest-passenger statute. Although
the court expressed the view that substantial constitutional issues were presented, it felt precluded from addressing them because of the prior summary dismissal of similar claims in
Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810 (1974). For cases reaching similar results due to the preclusive effect of prior summary decisions, see Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
428 U.S. 913 (1976); Archibald v. Whaland, 418 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.H. 1976), rev'don other
grounds, 555 F.2d 1061 (Ist Cir. 1977).
135. In this regard, Justice Brennan has observed: "[I]t is a consequence that must bode
ill for developing constitutional jurisprudence. If significant constitutional issues are to be
decided summarily without any briefing or oral argument, and with only momentary and
offhanded Conference discussion, and if these summary dispositions nevertheless bind the
courts of the 50 States and all lower federal courts, respect for our constitutional decisionmaking must inevitably be impaired." Sidle v. Majors, 429 U.S. 945, 948 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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scious of the admonitory language in Hicks, some courts have tended
to regard summary dispositions as conclusive on issues which in fact
may not have been considered. In Evans v. Buchanan,13 6 a case involving the desegregation of the Delaware public schools, the district judge
found eight separate constitutional violations and fashioned an interdistrict desegregation remedy, which was summarily affirmed by the
Supreme Court. 137 On remand to the Third Circuit, the controversy
focused on which of the eight violations had been affirmed on appeal.
Regarding the matter as precluded by the Hicks rule, the court simply
assumed that the Supreme Court's summary action had embraced all
eight findings. The court asserted that steps to divine the precise
grounds of the Court's decision "would become a highly speculative
power to attempt a modification of
exercise, if indeed, this court has the
13 8
judgment."'
Court's
the Supreme
3. Qualfication of the Hicks rule: Mandel v. Bradley
Despite misgivings reflected in various dissenting opinions over
the principle enunciated in Hicks,139 the Court continued to apply that
precedent without substantial qualification. 4 ' A departure came with
Mandel v. Bradley, 4 ' wherein the Court articulated important limitations on the precedential value of summary dispositions. Appellant
Bradley, an independent Maryland candidate for the United States
Senate, had challenged the Maryland statute governing access to the
ballot. The statutory procedure requires an individual to submit petitions signed by three per cent of the state's registered voters at least
seventy days in advance of the date on which party primaries are to be
136. 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affdmem., 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
137. Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
138. Evans v. Buchanan, 555 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1977).
139. Although Justice Brennan has voiced the most vigorous criticism of summary dispositions, his views are shared by other members of the Court. See, for example, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Buchanan v. Evans: "My dissent from that sort of affirmance here is based
on my conviction that it is extraordinarily slipshod judicial procedure as well as my conviction that it is incorrect." 423 U.S. at 975 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. &
Powell, J.).
140. See, e.g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68 (1976); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976). It should be noted that in Tully, the majority opinion
endorsed the passing statement of Justice Rehnquist in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974), that insofar as they bind the Supreme Court, summary dispositions "are not of the
same pr cedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the
merits." Id. at 671. In light of the relative impotence of stare deciis in constitutional adjudication, however, see, e.g., United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975), the Edelman
qualification seems to lose much of its significance.
141. 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
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held. After the State Administrative Board of Elections had determined that Bradley had failed to provide the requisite signatures, he
pressed his claim before a three-judge district court, contending that
the Maryland law imposed unconstitutional burdens on his associational and voting rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Relying upon a summary affirmance in Tucker v. Salera,142 which
struck down certain Pennsylvania ballotting procedures as applied to
independents, the court held for Bradley.
On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration.143 In a per curian opinion, the
Court explained that the lower court's reliance on Tucker had been
misplaced. The Pennsylvania statute in Tucker contained both an early filing deadline and a brief period during which the candidate could
garner voter signatures. These differences were significant enough to
distinguish Tucker, and the Court admonished the three-judge panel
that the precedential significance of any summary disposition "is to be
assessed in the light of all of the facts of that case."'" Adopting a
statement of Chief Justice Burger in Fusariv. Steinberg,145 the Mandel
Court stated that "a summary affirmance is an affirmance of the judgment only" and not necessarily a ratification of the reasoning underlying that judgment.1 46 The Court then placed a major modification on
the scope of Hicks:
Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial
federal question without doubt reject the specific challenges
presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment appealed from. They do prevent lower
courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues
presented and necessarily decided by those actions. . . . Summary actions, however, . . . should not be understood as breaking new ground but as applying principles
established by prior
147
decisions to the particular facts involved.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan perceived a more significant
erosion of the Hicks doctrine:
After today, judges of the state and federal systems are on notice
that, before deciding a case on the authority of a summary disposition by this Court in another case, they must (a) examine the
jurisdictional statement in the earlier case to be certain that the
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

424 U.S. 959 (1976).
432 U.S. at 179.
Id. at 177.
419 U.S. 379, 391 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
432 U.S. at 176.
Ird.
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constitutional questions presented were the same and, if they
were, (b) determine that the judgment in fact rests upon decision
of those questions and not even arguably upon some alternative
nonconstitutional ground. The judgment should not be interpreted as deciding the constitutional questions unless no other
construction of the disposition is plausible. In other words, after
today, "appropriate, but not necessarily conclusive, weight" is to
be given this Court's summary dispositions.48
It is difficult to assess the precise impact of Mandel on the precedential role of summary dispositions. In many respects, Mandel is not
a significant departure, for it merely underscores the limiting language
of Justice White's footnote in Hicks.'4 9 At the same time, Mandel is
not an unqualified endorsement of Hicks, for it reflects the Court's
growing disenchantment with the effects of summary dispositions.
Lower courts have been instructed to establish factual and legal parallels between cases sub judice and prior summary dispositions before
applying the latter as controlling authority. More significantly, Mandel
cautions state and federal judges against assuming too readily that
summary actions have broken "new ground;" such decisions should be
established by prior decisions to the
interpreted as "applying principles
' 50
particular facts involved."'
Recent cases suggest that Mandel may have diminished some of
the difficulties associated with Hicks, especially the foreclosure of debate on important constitutional issues among lower courts. In State v.
Saunders,' ' the New Jersey Supreme Court sustained an attack on the
New Jersey fornication statute as an infringement of the constitutional
right of privacy. Although the court drew heavily upon mainstream
privacy decisions,' 5 2 it did not overlook the summary disposition in
Doe v. Commonwealth'sAttorney, 5 3 which presumably upheld the Virginia sodomy statute as applied to sexual conduct among consenting
adults. Following the direction in Mandel, the court noted that "[We
are not inclined to read this controversial decision [Doe] too
148. Id. at 180 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149. See notes 123-24 and accompanying text supra.
150. 432 U.S. at 176. Prior to Mandel, some lower courts had devised theories for alleviating the rigors of a strict application of Hicks. B & P Dev. v. Walker, 420 F. Supp. 704
(W.D. Pa. 1976), set forth two possible situations in which a lower court might feel free to
disregard a summary disposition: (i) significant factual differences between the two cases
involved; and (ii) apparent doctrinal changes in subsequent opinions of the Court. Id. at
707-08.
151. 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
152. E.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
153. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), a'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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broadly."' 5 4 Thus, for courts willing to take strides in advancing the
development of constitutional law, Hicks no longer compels the blind
155
acceptance of summary dispositions as conclusive authority.

III. Should Obligatory Jurisdiction Be Retained?
Current proposals to eliminate the mandatory jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court inevitably stem from a concern over the Court's current
workload. Sometimes advanced only as a corollary to suggestions for
more drastic structural alterations,' 5 6 the argument for eliminating obligatory review ultimately rests on the assumption that such a change
will resolve the problems engendered by an overcrowded calendar and

that any justification for preserving review by appeal must be weighed
against the consequences of that caseload.' 5 7 But any forthright ap154. 75 N.J. at 207, 381 A.2d at 341.
155. The New Jersey Supreme Court took a similar view of a prior summary disposition
in K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272,
381 A.2d 774 (1977). Other courts have also detected the shift of emphasis embodied in
Mandel. In Drumright v. Padzieski, 436 F. Supp. 310 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the court observed
that "[slummary affirmances should be narrowly limited to the issues in their jurisdictional
statements." Id. at 316. For other preliminary indications of the flexibility that Mandel has
introduced into the rule of Hicks v. Miranda,see Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1010-11
(5th Cir. 1978); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1978); Bangor & A.R.R.
v. ICC, 574 F.2d 1096, 1104 (lst Cir. 1978); Moritt v. Governor of New York, 42 N.Y.2d
347, 352-53, 366 N.E.2d 1285, 1288, 397 N.Y.S.2d 929, 932 (1977) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., Freund Study Group, supra note 7, at 36-37.
157. At the root of many of the more sweeping proposals for Supreme Court reform
(such as creation of an additional judicial tier between lower tribunals and the Court or
taking from the Court some of its major categories ofjurisdiction) is the assumption that the
Court's caseload will continue to burgeon as the population and economy expand. E.g.,
Freund Study Group, supra note 7, at 3. In a statistical study of the subject, Professors
Casper and Posner have demonstrated that the foregoing characterization of the Court's
caseload may be inaccurate. Focusing on the trend between the October, 1957, and October,
1971, Terms, the authors attributed the rise in cases filed to the Court's substantive and
procedural rulings, not to advances in population or national income. Casper & Posner, .4
Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload,3 J. LEGAL STUDIES 339, 360 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Casper & Posner, 1957-1971 Terms]. Moreover, the authors predicted a long term
diminution in the Court's caseload. They reasoned that the value of seeking review is partly
a function of the probability of obtaining it. Consequently, "as that probability declines
over time due to increases in the number of cases filed coupled with the Court's inability to
increase significantly the number of cases that it accepts for review, the value of seeking
review will fall, and, other things being equal, the number of cases should decline." Id. at
361. In light of these observations, the authors saw no justification for radical alterations of
the Court's jurisdiction.
Updating their original study in 1977, Professors Casper and Posner noted that there
had indeed been no growth in the number of annual filings between the 1974 and 1976
Terms. Casper & Posner, The Caseloadof the Supreme Court: 1975 and 1976 Terms, 1977
Sup. CT. REV. 87, 95 [hereinafter cited as Casper & Posner, 1975 & 1076 Terms]. The two
scholars were reluctant to generalize, but they did speculate that this leveling off stemmed

Fall 1978]

MANDATORY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

praisal of obligatory review must be divorced from the temporal dimension for two reasons. In the first instance, an end to compulsory
appeals will probably have no appreciable effect on the volume of
papers filed with the Court each term. The litigious client who goes to
the expense of having his attorney prepare a tenuous jurisdictional
statement in a last-ditch effort to avoid an adverse judgment will not be
deterred in his attempt to secure Supreme Court review simply because
the only available procedure is certiorari. Because the Court presumably does read each petition received, the burden of sifting through colorless requests will remain. Although others have ignored this aspect,
3100 do recognize the bil's minimal effect
the proponents of Senate bill
58
on the Court's caseload.1
Secondly and more importantly, an innovation in the jurisdictional framework motivated solely by the heavy volume of cases reaching the Court could obscure the significant congressional policies
reflected in jurisdictional legislation. If one is willing to accept that the
Supreme Court will probably never be capable of hearing all of the
cases it should, uniform discretionary review would be an effective
stopgap measure, at least for eradicating the problems created by Hicks
59 Viewing the matter from this perspective, there would
v. Miranda.1
be little difficulty in dismissing the current statutory regime as an incoherent patchwork of efforts to deal with the Court's workload instituted
at various points in history. And respectable authority may be relied
upon for doing so.' 60 However, if one believes that the present burden
on the Court can be eased and that the change will come at other points
in the judicial system, then the near-term benefits of discarding
mandatory review are of only secondary importance, if not irrelevant.
from a balancing of factors such as termination of litigation related to the Vietnam War and
the establishment of precedent in areas such as elections. Id. at 97. Although this represented but a brief trend, the authors still found "no evidence of a worsening crisis requiring
precipitate measures." Id.
The Casper and Posner studies put the Court's caseload into perspective, but they do
not detract from the thrust of measures such as S. 3100. Although the authors forecast no
long range caseload expansion, they have not disputed the fact that the Court's existing
burden is onerous. Casper & Posner, 1957-1971 Terms 362; Casper & Posner, 1975 & 1976
Terms 97. Additionally, the conclusions in these studies do not bear on the problems posed
by Hicks v. Miranda,see notes 126-38 and accompanying text supra,nor are they helpful in
resolving the question of whether the continuation of mandatory review would really foster
important policies.
158. 124 CONG. REc. S7748 (daily ed. May 18, 1978) (statement of Senator DeConcini);
DeConciniCommittee Hearings,supra note 12, at 10 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Meador); id. at 22 (statement of Eugene Gressman).
159. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See notes 126-38 and accompanying text supra.
160. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 7, at 42.
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The advisability of retaining appeal as of right must be viewed apart
from the problem of docket congestion and against the backdrop of the
policies which undergird compulsory review in our appellate process.
The remainder of this article is devoted to a discussion of those policies
and to an analysis of possible objections to abandoning obligatory
jurisdiction.
A.

Vesting "Trust" in State Courts

As was previously demonstrated,' 6' the 1925 Court probably
seemed as ominously overburdened to the sixty-eighth Congress as today's Court appears to the sponsors of Senate bill 31(.62 The resulting legislative palliative was motivated principally by a desire for more
expeditious and authoritative Supreme Court review. The legislative
history of the Judges' Bill suggests, however, that the measure may
have been more than a unitary response. Although obligatory jurisdiction, through the writ of error, had been transplanted into our jurispru63
dence for reasons unrelated to the propriety of discretionary review,1
Congress began utilizing mandatory jurisdiction as an instrument for
singling out those cases which required a decision by the highest tribunal. The discussions in the period immediately prior to adoption of the
1925 Act in its final form indicate that Congress did not delete certain
classes of cases from the appeal category merely for reasons of expediency without reflecting upon the types of cases remaining in the
mandatory classification. Rather, the final form of the Judges' Bill suggests that Congress focused upon all cases then reviewable by appeal
and determined that important values were perpetuated by the lines
which were ultimately drawn between mandatory and discretionary
review.
It will be recalled that Chief Justice Taft defended the initial draft
of the 1925 Act with the questionable proposition that when presented
with a choice between local and national interests, a federal court
would be more likely to preserve the federal view than would a state
court."64 The Senate disregarded this argument and amended the law
to provide for writs of error to a court of appeals which invalidates a
state statute. 16 5 It is often hazardous to infer legislative intent from the
161. See notes 61-81 and accompanying text supra.
162. Although the 1925 Court was faced with barely half the caseload of today, that
Court had not yet instituted the jurisdictional statement as a screening device.
163. See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
164. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
165. See notes 77-79 and accompanying text supra.
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refinements and modifications of a bill as it winds its way through the
legislature. Yet, these changes by the Senate indicate that the framers
of the Judges' Bill were not willing to trust state judiciaries to the extent
of relinquishing mandatory review of cases in which a state statute is
sustained against federal attack or in which a state tribunal invalidates
a federal law. Similarly, the Senate could not accept the Chief Justice's
argument that, as between state and federal courts, the latter would
more predictably arrive at results which achieve a proper accommodation of federal and state interests. When either court is presented with
challenges to the laws of the other sovereignty, neither could be fully
trusted to the extent of making its decisions final with review only by
leave of the Supreme Court.
Senate bill 3100 would remove both of these categories from the
Court's obligatory jurisdiction. The bill's sponsors and others of a similar view contend that the implicit distrust of state courts manifested in
the 1925 Act no longer supports the appeal/certiorari distinction. This
position is typified by a recent Department of Justice Report:
Nor is there sufficient reason to require the Supreme Court to
review on the merits all cases in which the highest court of a state
invalidates a federal law or upholds a state statute in the face of a
federal constitutional attack. Mandatory Supreme Court review
in these circumstances implies that we cannot rely on state courts
to reach the proper result in such cases. This residue of implicit
distrust has no place in our federal system. State judges, like federal judges,16 6 are charged with upholding the federal
constitution.
The interaction between the state and federal governments today may
produce fewer clashes than in earlier, more sectionally divisive years.
Yet, one commentator has observed that current decisions of the
Supreme Court indicate that it is not convinced that the present accommodation between federal and state interests warrants relinquishing
special controls. 167 It has been argued that in the federal sector, the
renewed enthusiasm for the doctrine of Younger v. Harris68 suggests a
view on the Court that federal judges still do not show a proper respect
for state interests before intervening in state proceedings. Moreover,
166.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMMITTEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL

SYSTEM, THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 13 (1977). See also DeConcini Committee

Hearings,supra note 12, at 21 (statement of Eugene Gressman).
167. Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court-Some Recent
Developments, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 347, 354-56 (1977).
168. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). "[A] federal court must not, save in exceptional and extremely
limited circumstances, intervene by way of either injunction or declaration in an existing
state criminal prosecution. Such circumstances exist only when there is a threat of irreparable injury 'both great and immediate.'" (footnote omitted). Id. at 56.
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Oregon v. Hass'6 9 is said to show that the Court will carefully scrutinize a state court decision when it believes that the state tribunal is not
according sufficient weight to current interpretations of the

Constitution. 170
Activity in a separate but not unrelated area of federal law is also
claimed to cast doubt on the propriety of placing greater trust in the
states through uniform discretionary review. The majority position today seems to be that local prejudices, against which federal diversity
jurisdiction was designed to protect the non-resident litigant, no longer
exist; even if they do, diversity jurisdiction is still an ill-conceived safeguard. 17 1 But even the limited curtailment of diversity jurisdiction suggested by the American Law Institute generated a vigorous reply from
distinguished quarters that the prospect of local prejudice was significant enough to counsel retention of diversity jurisdiction in its present
form. 172 Justice Jackson once remarked that the two most critical federal intrusions on state sovereignty contained in the Judiciary Act of
1789 were review of state court decisions by the Supreme Court and
diversity jurisdiction.173 This suggests a possible institutional interrelation between the two controls, and perhaps any decision to constrict
one of these inroads should be made only upon considering the impact
on the other. If substantial doubt still exists that the states can be
trusted to the extent of abolishing diversity jurisdiction, Congress might
well reflect on whether it should manifest a similar trust by making
Supreme Court review of state cases permissive. Even if diversity
should be done away with, it may be argued that it is undesirable to
place a trust in the states at two points in the federal system by abolishing mandatory Supreme Court review.
The preceding discussion of whether the states may be trusted to
the extent of converting the present categories of obligatory appeal into
review by certiorari is derived from arguments which are disingenuous
at best. If there is a valid concern that a state judge will not abide by
his oath to enforce the Constitution, the availability of certiorari would
provide an adequate safeguard against serious federal/state collisions.
169. 420 U.S. 714 (1975). Ironically, the state court in Hasswas balking at application of
the Court's more restricted version of the Mfiranda rule.
170. Tushnet, supra note 167, at 355.
171. Wechsler, FederalJurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948).
172. For authorities opposing and supporting the A.L.I. proposals, see Shapiro, Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction: .4 Survey and.4 Proposal,91 HARV. L. REv. 317, 318 n.8 (1977).
173. R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
33 (1957).
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The apparent subversion of federal law by a state court would certainly
be an element in the Court's judgment in granting or denying certiorari. In support of this position, two scholars have concluded:
By completely eliminating the right of appeal, it may be thought
that civil rights would be imperilled, particularly where the state
court has denied the federal claim and sustained the state statute.
But the Supreme Court has been particularly watchful where
civil rights have been involved, and it can be relied on in these
situations, as in all others, to review cases that are worthy of its
consideration. If the ranking Court can be trusted to decide
cases-to establish the supreme law of the land, it can surely be
trusted to determine what cases it should decide. 4
This type of statement has become a stock response to the argument
that mandatory jurisdiction should exist for the disposition of important classes of cases. 175 Perhaps the proponents of this thesis should
heed the admonition of one federal judge that "[tihe constitutionality
of [a] procedure should not rest on the dubious assumption that discretion will always be exercised as the Constitution demands."'' 76 But it
does seem reasonable to assume that any case significant enough to
claim an obligatory appeal would fulfill the criteria set out in Rule 19
for discretionary review.
The hypothesis that the Younger line of "abstention" cases and
Oregon v.Hass demonstrate a belief on the Court that there has not
been an accomodation of federal and state interests sufficient to abandon special controls is also unpersuasive. The Court has actually manifested a willingness to give state judiciaries a freer hand in the
development of constitutional principles. 17 7 In a recent opinion, Justice
Powell specifically addressed the issue of placing trust in state judges:
Despite differences in institutional environment and the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some state
judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that there now
exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional
rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States. State
174. Moore & Vestal, supra note 90, at 45.
175. Freund Study Group, supra note 7, at 37; Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in
Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 74 (1964); Note, The InsubstantialFederal
Question, supra note 84, at 494.
176. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969) (Anderson, J., dissenting).
177. With the tendency of the current Court to foreclose federal remedies, this trust
vested in state courts assumes critical importance. As Justice Brennan has stated: "With the
federal locus of our double protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the states
betray the trust the Court has put in them. . . .With federal scrutiny diminished, state
courts must respond by increasing their own." Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV. L. REV.489, 503 (1977).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:297

courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation
to
7
safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law. 1
Senate bill 3100 is consistent with Justice Powell's observations
and accurately reflects the current accommodation of state and federal
interests. By eliminating the mandatory Supreme Court review of state
cases raising federal issues, Senate bill 3100 vests a degree of trust in
state courts which properly discounts any lingering misgivings about
the fidelity of state jurists to the principles of the supremacy clause.
Moreover, Senate bill 3100 comports with the scheme of federalism
contemplated by the Constitution. In view of the fact that the Constitution does not mandate the establishment of lower federal courts, it is
clear that the framers anticipated that most, if not all, federal questions
would be initially litigated in state tribunals with ultimate review by
the Supreme Court. 179 Therefore, state judiciaries were envisioned as
the primary guarantors of constitutional rights. 8 ' Senate bill 3100
complements this principle by mitigating the lack of trust which inheres
in the concept of compulsory review.
B. "Trusting" the Supreme Court
It has been posited by one writer that the line of reasoning pointing to the total elimination of appeal as of right depreciates important
aspects of separation of powers.' 8' The wholesale substitution of discretionary review would invest sole authority in the Court for deciding
which classes of cases are worthy of its attention. Under its current
exercise of certiorari jurisdiction, the Court is making distinctions
based upon importance only as to individual cases; completely turning
over to the Court the task of identifying important classes of cases for
its review may be an impermissible surrender of a legislative prerogative. The current range of mandatory appeals is based primarily upon
cases involving the invalidation of state and federal legislation. Implementation of universal discretionary review would allow the Court to
distinguish among statutes on the basis of that tribunal's notions of national significance. This may put the Court in the position of making
essentially political judgments and is an area in which lines drawn by
82
Congress may be more acceptable than those drawn by judges.1
178. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976).
179. This is also borne out by the fact that Congress did not confer general federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts until the latter part of the nineteenth century.
See note 47 supra.
180. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 359-60.
181. Tushnet, supra note 167, at 358-65.
182. Id.
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Senate bill 3100 and other broadly based proposals calling for the
total abandonment of mandatory jurisdiction either discount or completely ignore these "separation of powers" objections. In defense of
the reformists' position, however, the preceding "separation of powers"
considerations are probably more supposed than real. In any dispute
over the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, Congress, under the
exceptions and regulations clause, will have the final word. In recent
years, the constitutional debate has centered upon how far Congress
may go in controlling the Supreme Court by putting certain types of
cases beyond its purview. Most proposals of this stripe collapsed under
intense political resistance, and the constitutional power of Congress to
regulate the Court remains somewhat uncertain.IS3 Undoubtedly, there
are limits to the exceptions and regulations clause at both ends of the
spectrum, but the shift from obligatory to discretionary review does not
appear to be an abdication of congressional power.' 84 There may be
practical objections to making all Supreme Court review optional, for if
the Court exercises permissive review in a manner that proves undesirable, legislative inertia may make it difficult for Congress to undo what
it has done. However, this practical observation hardly rises to the stature of a constitutional prohibition.
Any defense or condemnation of obligatory jurisdiction ultimately
reveals its exponent's conception of the role of the Supreme Court in
our system of government, and the putative separation of powers argument essentially expresses an unwillingness to place complete trust in
the Court as an institution. If this distrust stems from a deep-seated
concern over the frailties of human-designed institutions, it is an objection not easily answered. On this level of analysis, ultimate reliance
must be placed on "a judiciary of high competence and character and
the constant play of an informed professional critique upon its
work"' 5 to insure the proper functioning of a standard under which
the jurist must exercise discretion. On the other hand, if these misgivings have a limited basis and grow only out of the notion that a congressional directive is needed to restrain the Court, a sufficient reply
seems available. Professor Wechsler has insisted that the courts do not
183. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 360-65.
184. The drafters of S. 3100 have kept this proposition firmly in view: "In establishing
the Court's appellate jurisdiction under Article III, Congress can confer as much or as little
compulsory jurisdiction as it deems necessary and proper, including such exceptions as Congress thinks appropriate. If Congress wants to make the Court's appellate jurisdiction totally
discretionary or totally obligatory in nature, nothing in the Constitution says 'no."' 1978
SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3 (citation omitted).
185. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
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have a "discretion to abstain or intervene when constitutional infringements are established in cases properly before them in the course of
litigation."' 8 6 If this judicial duty is embedded in the Constitution,
then it should not necessitate legislative action to ensure its observance.
As a practical matter, perhaps Congress should employ obligatory
review to correlate the constitutional duty of the Court more fully with
the types of cases which are coming before it.' 8 7 In this connection, it
might be useful to consider one scholar's reservations about the reach
of the Judges' Bill. Although Justice (then Professor) Frankfurter favored the increased use of certiorari, he was not entirely convinced that
writ of error should not lie when a federal court declares a federal statute unconstitutional. If the variety of cases now contained in section
1257 is seen as critical enough to require compulsory review, the justice's remarks are particularly appropriate:
To be sure, there is little likelihood that the Supreme Court
would withhold permissive review of a case in which a circuit
court of appeals invalidated an act of Congress. But a scientifically framed judicial code ought to give formal as well as practical expression to the governing ideas of a judicial system. If the
invalidation of an act of Congress by a lower federal court is, as a
matter of fact, one of the clearest cases for invoking the judgment
for review should be exof the Supreme Court, the opportunity
1 88
plicit and not left to discretion.
In light of the foregoing, it seems clear that Congress, through
Senate bill 3100, has outlined the appropriate role for the Supreme
Court in reviewing state decisions raising federal issues. Replacing appeals as of right with discretionary review is not an abdication of congressional power under the exceptions and regulations clause, but
rather expresses a sound interpretation of the Supreme Court's obligations under the supremacy clause.
C. The Problem of Summary Dispositions
The most serious objection to retaining obligatory review stems
from the inevitable resort by the Court to summary dispositions and
the precedential weight accorded such treatment of appeals. The difficulties created by the rule in Hicks v. Miranda"9 are a principal target
of Senate bill 3100. The elimination of mandatory jurisdiction would
186. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. RE'. 1001, 1011 (1965).
187. See Henkin, Foreword- On DrawingLines, 82 HARV. L. REa'. 63, 89 n.89 (1968);
Wechsler, TowardNeutral Prncilesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 10 (1959);
Shanks, Book Review, 84 HARV. L. REv.256, 258 n.17 (1970).
188. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 7, at 286.
189. 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See notes 126-38 and accompanying text supra.
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reduce the inflexibility that Hicks introduced into the process of interpreting Supreme Court decisions. All summary dispositions would
have only the effect of a denial of certiorari which "carries with it no
implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits."' 90
State and lower federal judges would not be compelled under the
supremacy clause to adhere to precedents, the reasoning of which cannot be ascertained.
Even in this context, however, the abolition of the right of appeal
would have a questionable impact. Much of the opposition to Hicks as
the inevitable consequence of obligatory review grows out of the ambiguity that that rule produces in the law. But it is difficult to accept the
proposition that equating summary dispositions with denials of certiorari will impart greater certainty. Denials of certiorari are rarely accompanied by explanatory remarks. Dissents from such refusals may
cast some light on the reasons for the Court's disposition, but since Justice Douglas' retirement, the volume of these dissenting opinions has
steadily decreased. Nor would making all review permissive reduce the
stimulus for relitigating unresolved issues; summary dispositions with
no binding effect might even foster more litigation. The certiorari process encompasses a wide range of variables, for Rule 19 is only a nonexelusive list of factors drawn upon by the Court. As Justice Harlan
noted, "[I]f a lawyer cannot assess with some degree of confidence the
imponderables involved it is quite understandable that he should conceive it to be his duty to try for certiorari."' 9'
On a more elevated plane of analysis, the emphasis on certainty
may be misplaced, for similarly to the one-dimensional concern for
caseload, it minimi es the overriding policies reflected in obligatory review. Even with cases receiving plenary consideration which result in
opinions absorbing several hundred pages of the UnitedStates Reports,
it is sometimes difficult to divine just what the Court held. 2 This observation is certainly no argument for promoting needless legal complexities, for while the vagaries in the law may intrigue the
academician, they often frustrate the practitioner trying to advise a client. But the fact that the judicial process inevitably results in a certain
190. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).
191. Harlan, Manning the Dikes, 13 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 541, 549 (1958). See also
Prettyman, Petitioningthe Supreme Court-A PrimerforHopeful Neophytes, 51 VA. L. REV.
582, 583 (1965).
192. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (percuriam; five separate opinions); New
York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam; six concurring and three
dissenting opinions).
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lack of clarity indicates that the interest in certainty should not be the
sole determinant in the debate over obligatory review.
The advantages of repealing mandatory jurisdiction in terms of
the resulting certainty in the law are unclear. If important values are
perpetuated by the retention of obligatory review, the specific problem
posed by Hicks could be remedied by less drastic means. Mandel is an
indication that the Court has already gravitated to a position which
accords summary dispositions less precedential weight than full opinions, even with respect to their binding effect on lower courts.1 93 This
theory of limited precedential effect may prove difficult to administer
without destroying the significance of mandatory jurisdiction, but if obligatory review furthers important policies in our scheme of government, this approach is well worth investigating.
D.

Should Any Form of Mandatory Jurisdiction Survive?

1. The present structure
In recent years, Congress has embarked on a program of constricting the scope of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction. In 1971, direct
appeals from district court invalidations of federal indictments were
discontinued. 194 In 1974, Congress repealed the requirement contained
in the Expediting Act of immediate Supreme Court review of government antitrust cases.' 95 That same year witnessed the elimination of
three-judge review of certain Interstate Commerce Commission orders. 196 In 1976, Congress narrowed the requirement that challenges to
state statutes be brought before three-judge district courts; these panels
are now convened only in civil rights cases and cases involving congressional redistricting or state legislative reapportionment.197 Despite
these substantial excisions, Congress retained review by appeal for
three-judge district court decisions. 9 8
193. See notes 139-55 and accompanying text supra.
194. Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644, § 14, 84 Stat. 1890.
195. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat.
1709.
196. Act of Jan. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1917.
197. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
198. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). It should be noted that S. 3100 would also retain this
category of obligatory appeals. 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 10-11. Preserving
the mandatory review of three-judge panels is explicable on grounds quite distinguishable
from the policies undergirding obligatory review of state court decisions. The three-judge
procedure might be viewed as a necessary compromise: In certain types of cases Congress
has decided to bypass the single-judge level and, as if in exchange, has guaranteed Supreme
Court review. The three-judge court has come under increasing criticism and may no longer
be justified. Yet if one is willing to accept this procedure in principle, mandatory Supreme
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As a result of this legislative activity, the current principal categories of mandatory appeals include a fairly narrow range of cases: (i)
cases in which a state court declares a federal statute unconstitutional
or sustains a state law against a federal challenge; 199 (ii) cases in which
a federal court of appeals invalidates a state law;2 °° (iii) cases in which
a federal court invalidates a federal statute where the United States is a
party to the litigation;2 "' (iv) orders by three-judge panels granting or
denying injunctive relief;2" 2 and (v) certified questions from the federal
courts of appeals and the Court of Claims.20 3
In view of the above discussion, it is doubtful that discretionary
Supreme Court review of state cases would present genuine constitutional objections. The current statute apparently reflects, and its defenders operate under, assumptions about the degree of trust which
should be vested in state courts and the Supreme Court which are probably no longer valid. 2' Indeed, these assumptions may not have been
completely sound even in 1925. Whatever constraining influence
mandatory review may have on a state judge would be difficult to test
empirically. It is a rare occurrence for a state court to invalidate a federal statute or treaty. 2 5 Cases in which a state judge upholds a state
law against a federal attack are more frequent, but the vast majority of
state cases reaching the Supreme Court today arrive there by way of
evidence is at best ambiguous on the issue of how far
certiorari. 206 This evd
state courts may be trusted, but it does suggest that certiorari would be
adequate to the task of preserving the supremacy of federal law in cases
in which federal and state provisions clash.
Even if misgivings as to the degree of trust that should be vested in
state courts are serious enough to warrant the maintenance of obligatory jurisdiction, they do not justify preserving the existing statutory
scheme. If these considerations require mandatory review, it makes little sense to differentiate between federal challenges to state legislative
Court review may well be irresistible. The absence of obligatory review of three-judge decisions would create a class of cases in which the losing party has no review as of right at all.
With state cases raising federal issues, the unsuccessful party usually has access to at least
one compulsory appeal in the state system.
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(I)-(2) (1976).
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (1976).
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976).
203. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(3), 1255(2) (1976). For other extremely narrow and rarely inyoked classifications of appeals, see note 14 supra.
204. See notes 162-88 and accompanying text supra.
205. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 103, at §§ 3.3-.4.
206. Id. at § 3.4.
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action, where under section 1257(2) review is by appeal,2 °7 and those to
state judicial or executive action, where certiorari is prescribed by section 1257(3).208 This distinction assumes that a state supreme court is
more receptive to local interests in cases dealing with a state statute
than in cases involving state judicial or executive action. It might be
argued that a statute tends to have broader reach than judicial or executive decisions and therefore presents a greater potential encroachment
upon federal interests. Yet, if hostility to federal values is to be the
touchstone of obligatory review in this field, this dichotomy is difficult
to defend. 20 9
This inconsistency is compounded by Dahnke-Walker Milling Co.
v. Bondurant,z1 ° wherein the Court held that in terms of general importance, a federal challenge to the application of a state statute presented
an issue as serious as an attack on the statute on its face. Accordingly,
a case sustaining a state law as applied can be reviewed by appeal.
Justice Brandeis' dissent warned that "the right to a review will depend,
in large classes of cases,. . . upon the skill of counsel,"2 11I and experience has borne this out. 212 If the difference between paragraphs (2) and
(3) of section 1257 is not responsive to the issue of trust, the gloss contributed by Dahnke-Walker makes the distinction even more tenuous.
Dahnke-Walker has been criticized as a "needless complexity, 2 1 3 and
if obligatory review of state decisions were to remain, this excrescence
should be removed. z 4
Congress could undoubtedly revamp section 1257 to rid it of its
internal inconsistencies and to remove the Dahnke- Walker complexity,
but the question remains whether the existing scheme, if so modified,
would really perpetuate important policies. Arguments based upon
distrust of state judges and the Supreme Court do not seem valid, but
perhaps mandatory jurisdiction fosters a desirable political objective.
As was noted at the outset of this subsection, 1 5 obligatory jurisdiction
has been pared down to a narrow range of situations which, save the
certified question provisions and litigations to which the United States
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976).
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976).
209. Tushnet, supra note 167, at 353.
210. 257 U.S. 282 (1921).

211. Id. at 298 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
212. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 15, at 637.

213. Judicial Improvement Hearings, supra note 90, at 275-76 (statement of Paul A.
Freund). See also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 7, at 215.

214. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed Dahnke-Walker on similar facts. Allenberg
Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974).
215. See notes 194-203 and accompanying text supra.
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is a party, involve cases in which the legislation of one sovereignty is
invalidated by the courts of another. When a federal judge overturns a
state statute, he is confounding the will of the people as voiced by their
representatives in the legislature. When a state judge upholds a state
statute against a federal challenge or sets aside a federal law, he is placing the judgment of the local representative body above the collective
wisdom of the nation as reflected in Congress. By now, it is beyond
peradventure that judicial review, even though it may lead to examination of the acts of the political branches, is an integral component of the
constitutional framework. Certiorari seems sufficient for policing excessive activism by state and lower federal judges. Yet, perhaps there is
some symbolic value in Congress expressing, through mandatory jurisdiction, that this class of cases should not be left to Supreme Court
review by chance, even though the likelihood of an actual denial of
review in a truly important case would otherwise be remote. It may be
worthwhile, from the standpoint of a rationally designed democratic
system, that in situations in which the undemocratic branches are likely
to have acted most undemocratically, the invocation of the highest tribunal's refereeing powers is guaranteed by law and is not a matter of
discretion.
The costs of preserving this form of symbolism may be prohibitive,
for it necessarily comes at the expense of perpetuating the current system of summary dispositions which operate as binding adjudications
on the merits. The dilemma posed by Hicks2 16 may have been mitigated by the qualifications in Mandel, 17 but the burden of administering such an uncertain rule would probably outweigh any symbolic
value which the current system of obligatory review may embody.
From this perspective, the proponents of Senate bill 3100 have the
stronger argument.
2. Obligatoryjurisdictiongenerally

In the final analysis, Senate bill 3100 is justifiable as a legitimate,
temporary response to the problems created by mandatory review.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that obligatory jurisdiction
can serve no valid function in the appellate process. Congress might
reflect upon whether compulsory jurisdiction can be reformulated to
encompass a class of cases which are agreed to raise issues of a fundamental nature. Because the Bill of Rights, as written, interpreted and
applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, is meant to
216. See notes 126-38 and accompanying text supra.
217. See notes 141-55 and accompanying text supra.
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restrain government as it affects individuals, perhaps cases which implicate these safeguards should form the core of a new obligatory jurisdiction. Considering the ease with which conventional common law
actions are converted into constitutional claims, however, the task of
drafting a sufficiently precise mandatory classification might prove
nearly impossible. Indeed, even a narrow categorization would probably worsen the Court's workload, putting it on a footing similar to that
in the 1925 Term when obligatory cases occupied eight), percent of the
docket.2 18
Even if an acceptable compulsory classification were devised, the
constitutional obligations of the Supreme Court and the availability of
certiorari suggest that compulsory review of any sort may have no
place in our federal system. Even with cases based upon the Bill of
Rights, obligatory review would ultimately rest upon the same assumptions about the degree of trust which should be lodged in the
Court-assumptions which this article has explored and discounted.21 9
Nonetheless, Congress might well consider all the possibilities before
definitively concluding that it can conceive of no class of cases significant enough to warrant Supreme Court review with only a minimal
exercise of discretion.
Conclusion
The concept of obligatory review was imported into American
practice through the writ of error for reasons entirely distinct from the
question of whether or not the Supreme Court should have discretion
in exercising its appellate jurisdiction over state courts. -20 In its early
twentieth century efforts to curtail the Court's mandatory jurisdiction
and to make its caseload more manageable, Congress utilized the right
of appeal to designate classes of cases significant enough to warrant
compulsory review. 22 1 In recent years, the Court's calendar has swollen, forcing that tribunal to infuse more discretion into the handling of
22 3 has made sumappeals.22 2 In addition, the rule in Hicks v. Miranda
2
2
4
mary dispositions binding,
and lower courts have encountered difficulty in determining the exact effect of such dispositions. 225 A repeal of
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 181-88 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 20-24 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 1-2 & 88-109 and accompanying text supra.
422 U.S. 322 (1975).
See notes 119-22 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 126-38 and accompanying text supra.
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mandatory review does not raise serious constitutional questions and is
defensible as a temporary solution to the problems flowing from Hicks.

